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This dissertation investigates non-linear macroeconomic dynamics within the
New Keynesian model during periods with zero short-term nominal interest rates.
I implement modern quantitative tools to solve and analyze Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models where the feedback rule that defines monetary
policy is subject to the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) constraint. The revived attention
about the importance of the ZLB constraint followed the extreme events that took
place in the United States after the financial crisis of 2008.
The first chapter studies aggregate dynamics near the ZLB of nominal interest
rates in a medium-scale New Keynesian model with capital. I use Sequential Monte
Carlo methods to uncover the shocks that pushed the U.S. economy to the ZLB
during the Great Recession and investigate the interaction between shocks and fric-
tions in generating the contraction of output, consumption and investment during
2008:Q3-2013:Q4. I find that a combination of shocks to the marginal efficiency
of investment and to households’ discount factor generated the prolonged liquidity
trap observed in this period. A comparison between these two sources suggests that
investment shocks played a more important role in accounting for the contraction
of economic activity. Fiscal and monetary policy stimulus helped the U.S. economy
avoid deflation and accelerated the recovery.
The second chapter studies a New-Keynesian model with Markov sunspot
shocks that move the economy between a targeted-inflation regime and a deflation
regime and fit it to data from the U.S. and Japan. For the U.S. we find that
adverse demand shocks have moved the economy to the zero lower bound (ZLB) in
2009 and an expansive monetary policy has kept it there subsequently. In contrast,
Japan has experienced a switch to the deflation regime in 1999 and remained there
since then, except for a short period. The two scenarios have drastically different
implications for macroeconomic policies. Fiscal multipliers are about 20% smaller
in the deflationary regime, despite the economy remaining at the ZLB. While a
commitment by the central bank to keep rates near the ZLB doubles the fiscal
multipliers in the targeted-inflation regime (U.S.), it has no effect in the deflation
regime (Japan).
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Chapter 1 What Explains the Great Recession and the Slow
Recovery?
1.1 Introduction
From 2007 to 2009 the U.S. economy was caught up in the throes of a severe
recession. The Great Recession was the worst episode of economic contraction since
the Great Depression, with consumption and investment plunging after the collapse
of large financial institutions in September 2008. It has taken over half a decade for
the economy to climb back to pre-recession levels. This episode is noteworthy not
only because of its depth and subsequent slow recovery, but also because monetary
policy quickly became constrained by the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) on nominal
interest rates. The Federal Reserve responded swiftly, lowering the Federal Funds
Rate to nearly zero by the first quarter of 2009. The policy rate has remained at
the ZLB for over five years to this date. Two natural questions arise: what made
the Great Recession so severe and why was the recovery slow?
Five years after the end of the recession, modern macroeconomic models con-
tinue to struggle to generate a coherent story about the events that caused such a
severe contraction in economic activity. On the one hand, existing medium scale
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DSGE models that are able to account for the dynamics of aggregate quantities and
prices abstract from the ZLB because of the computational complexity of solving
rational expectation models with nonlinearities. On the other hand, models that
explicitly account for the ZLB adopt highly stylized frameworks that abstract from
investment or assume very simple structures that limit their quantitative capability
to match the dynamics during the Great Recession. This paper focuses on bridging
this gap. I use the structure of a modern macro model commonly used for quantita-
tive analysis and a set of computational techniques that help me paint a full picture
of the causes of the Great Recession and the slow recovery. A key contribution is to
uncover the shocks that pushed the nominal interest rate to the ZLB and understand
their role in shaping the evolution of aggregate demand, in particular investment,
which is often ignored in models with a ZLB constraint.
Given the length of the ZLB spell, the ability to solve quantitative models
that incorporate this fundamental constraint on monetary policy is essential for our
understanding of the Great Recession. This is precisely the goal of this paper. I
look at U.S. data from the perspective of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model that incorporates the ZLB constraint. My model builds on the
work of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007),
which has been widely adopted for quantitative analyses by researchers and policy
institutions. I use Sequential Monte Carlo methods (SMC) to structurally estimate
the shocks that explain the recession and the slow recovery. Moreover, I use the
estimated shocks to investigate how fiscal and monetary policies contributed to the
recovery.
2
Compared to similar work that investigates the causes of the Great Recession
in models that allow for the ZLB, this paper provides a broader answer for two
reasons. First, I use a medium scale DSGE model that incorporates investment.
Adding investment is crucial in order to understand the importance of shocks re-
lated to financial frictions, which have been argued to be at the root of the recession.
Second, I take a novel approach to the structural estimation of shocks, combining
nonlinear solution methods with SMC techniques. To the best of my knowledge,
this paper is the first to apply both computational techniques simultaneously in a
medium scale New Keynesian DSGE model of the type that is commonly used for
policy analysis, and use them to unveil the underlying drivers of the Great Reces-
sion. In addition, I use the estimated structural shocks to conduct counterfactual
exercises. Among the five disturbances included in the model economy, I consider
a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment (investment shock) and a shock
to households’ subjective discount factor (preference shock). Both shocks represent
deeper frictions in the financial sector of the economy in a reduced form way.1
I find that the Great Recession originated in a decline in the marginal efficiency
of investment. This decline started in the second half of 2007 and worsened in the
third quarter of 2008, after the bankruptcy of important financial institutions. The
U.S. economy encountered the ZLB as monetary policy responded to large negative
1This modeling approach is commonly used in DSGE models. For example, Smets and Wouters
(2007) introduce a ‘risk-premium’ shock that affects the relative price of the nominal bond. In
contrast, Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010) use a shock to households’ subjective dis-
count factor instead of the ‘risk-premium’ shock. Up to a first order, both frictions enter in the
consumption Euler equation in the same way, but the risk-premium shock also affects the spread
between the return on capital and bonds directly.
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shock to households’ ability to borrow and to the ability of the financial system
to channel resources to investment. In the absence of these latter two shocks the
recession would have been milder, with output falling 20% less with respect to its
pre-recession trend and consumption and investment recovering fully to pre-crisis
levels by the end of 2010. My results indicate that the U.S. economy remained at
the ZLB in the aftermath of the recession because of stimulative monetary policy
that kept the nominal interest rate pegged at zero. During the liquidity trap, fiscal
policy provided substantial stimulus, in particular during 2009:Q2-2011:Q2, and its
stimulative effect on output helped the economy stave off deflation. Without the
fiscal stimulus, inflation would have been close to -3% when the economy hit rock
bottom in 2009:Q1 and would have remained negative for another two quarters.
The unwinding of the fiscal stimulus program in 2011 and political struggles that
resulted in a reversion in the stance of fiscal policy held back the recovery.
A general consensus has emerged among economists that the recession origi-
nated in the financial system. However, the source and relative importance of fric-
tions that caused the financial system to fail remain open to debate. For example,
Mian, Rao and Sufi (2013) show that households’ deleveraging reduced consumption
in early 2007 and 2008, leading the collapse of the financial system. On the other
hand, Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012) point towards depressed investment due to
sharp increases in borrowing costs for firms as the leading cause of the recession.
Whether shocks affecting households consumption were more important than fric-
tions disrupting investment, is of particular interest for policy evaluation. Should
policy have focused on alleviating households’ mortgage debt and rehabilitating the
4
housing market? Or should it have concentrated on providing resources to replenish
bank capital and avoiding the collapse of financial intermediaries and investment
banks? My results indicate that shocks and frictions affecting investment played a
prominent role in explaining the Great Recession. I also find that these frictions
remain elevated today compared to their pre-recession level, which explains the
sluggishness in the economic recovery.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses related
literature. Section 1.3 shows some important features of the data and a potential
interpretation of the shocks that explain the dynamics around the Great Recession.
The DSGE model used for the quantitative analysis is spelled out in detail in Section
1.4. In Section 1.5, I discuss the parameterization and the solution strategy of the
nonlinear model that explicitly incorporates the ZLB. Section 1.6 describes how to
uncover the structural shocks that pushed the economy to the ZLB. Section 1.7
presents a series of counterfactual exercises to understand the economy’s dynamics
during and after the Great Recession. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper fits within the literature that investigates macroeconomic dynam-
ics in the presence of the Zero Lower Bound constraint. Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003b) were the first to study the behavior of the economy at the ZLB in a New
Keynesian DSGE model. However, to maintain analytical tractability and to char-
acterize optimal policy, their setup abstracts from capital accumulation. To take
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the economy to the ZLB they study the effect of a temporary, unanticipated rise in
households’ discount factor that increases the real interest rate and lowers consump-
tion. Their setup delivers sharp insights on the mechanics of ZLB events but it is
not suited for quantitative analysis. In this regard, my paper is different because I
incorporate capital accumulation and investment, and allow for five different shocks
that drive the dynamics of the economy, bringing models that study the ZLB and
business cycle dynamics closer together.
Much of the subsequent work on the ZLB adopted the Eggertsson and Wood-
ford (2003b) modeling environment. For example, Eggertsson (2009b) investigates
the effects of alternative fiscal policies at the ZLB, while Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo (2011a) studies the size of the fiscal multiplier. These papers assume
that a shock to households’ discount factors is what causes the ZLB to bind, and
hence the narrative around liquidity trap episodes has been centered on frictions
that mostly affect consumption. Compared to this line of work, in my model there
are two shocks that can push the economy to the ZLB: one that affects house-
holds’ discount factors and works exactly in the same way as in related literature,
and another that disturbs aggregate investment dynamics directly. Because I want
to quantify the forces that took the U.S. economy to the ZLB during the Great
Recession, I let the data uncover the role of each shock, and investigate their rel-
ative contributions to the depth of the recession and the slow economic recovery.
Shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment have a long tradition in business
cycle analysis since Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988), and have recently
been rekindled as a dominant source of business cycles fluctuations by Justiniano,
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Primiceri and Tambalotti (2011). However, my paper is the first to quantify the
relative importance of these alternative shocks in generating a liquidity trap.
This paper uses a medium-scale DSGE model along the lines of Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). Variants of such
models have been used to study business cycle dynamics, as in Justiniano, Primiceri
and Tambalotti (2010), or to investigate trade-offs in monetary policy stabilization
as in Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2013). Moreover, variants of such models
have been widely adopted in policy making institutions in the U.S. and around
the world. Compared to this literature, my paper is among the few that solves
the full nonlinear dynamics of a medium-scale model subject to a ZLB constraint.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011a) was an early attempt to bring the ZLB
into a medium-scale DSGE model but only to study the size of the fiscal multiplier.
In related work, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2014) solve a DSGE model
that accounts for labor market variables as well as aggregate demand and prices.
I differ from Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2014) in a one key aspect.
I use a particle filter to perform a formal estimation of the shocks that explain the
data as seen through the structure of the model. In contrast, they take a less
formal approach, exploiting the first order conditions of their model to map certain
observables in the data into unobserved wedges in the model. In doing so they
need to take a stand on the observables that best correspond to their proposed
wedges, and impose additional restrictions in order to map the observables to the
model equilibrium conditions. I do not impose such restrictions, instead letting
the data speak freely about the driving forces that caused the recession. As an
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example of such restrictions, to facilitate a direct measurement of the consumption
and financial wedges, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2014) assume a zero
covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the ex-ante real interest rate.
In my application, the estimation of the shocks respects the nonlinear equilibrium
conditions of the model at all times, and hence the estimation and interpretation of
the shocks is more transparent.
This paper also sheds light on the importance of financial frictions during the
Great Recession. Although, I do not incorporate an explicit mechanism like the
financial accelerator of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), or model financial
amplification through bank balance sheets as in Gertler and Karadi (2011), I take a
reduced form approach that is useful for measuring the strength and persistence of
financial frictions. An additional advantage of my approach is that the frictions that
I recover from the data can be rationalized with different microeconomic mechanisms
for financial frictions. I consider two shocks that can be interpreted as disruptions in
financial markets. In this regard, my paper also echoes the main result in Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2014), which attributes most of the fluctuations during
the Great Recession to a financial wedge. However, I do not need to assume that such
a wedge can be recovered directly from data on credit spreads only.2 In my filtering
exercises, I back out the equivalent to a financial wedge directly from observed data
on consumption, investment and output growth. It turns out that my reduced form
measure of financial frictions is closely related to fluctuations in the observed cost of
2Their results are sensitive to the particular measure of spreads. When they use Gilchrist
and Zakraǰsek (2012) measure of credit spreads, their financial wedge is not persistent enough to
produces a long lasting recession as the one observed in the U.S.
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borrowing for nonfinancial firms during the worst part of the crisis, but my measure
remains persistently high even after observed credit spreads return to pre-recession
levels.
In terms of methodology this paper builds on the solution methods developed
in Judd, Maliar and Maliar (2012), Aruoba, Cuba-Borda and Schorfheide (2013),
Gust, Lopez-Salido and Smith (2012b), and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012b) to
characterize the full nonlinear equilibrium dynamics of DSGE models subject to
occasionally binding constraints.3 Compared to the discrete state-space solution
method based on policy function iteration reviewed in Richter, Throckmorton and
Walker (2011), my paper uses a combination of projection and simulation techniques
to find the global approximation to the model decision rules. The advantage is that
my solution strategy is more suitable for medium-scale models with many state
variables. To extract the unobserved shocks that drive the dynamics during the
Great Recession, I implement a particle filter adapted from the work in Aruoba,
Cuba-Borda and Schorfheide (2013).
1.3 The Great Recession
Before discussing the model, I briefly review the evolution of key macroe-
conomic aggregates during and after the Great Recession. Figure 1.1 shows the
comovement of key macroeconomic variables before and after the Great Recession.
3Gust, Lopez-Salido and Smith (2012b) are the first to estimate model parameters in a small
New Keynesian with a ZLB, but their setup abstracts from capital, which prevents them from
studying the evolution of investment in the data.
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I look at the cyclical components of quarterly data on Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), consumption and investment.4 All series are expressed in annualized real
per-capita terms. I extract the cyclical component using the Hodrick-Prescott filter
with a standard smoothing parameter for quarterly observations. I normalize the
data to 2007:Q3, which is the quarter prior to the official start of the recession ac-
cording to the NBER. The y-axis in the figure is expressed in terms of the percent
change relative to the peak of the NBER cycle. Output, investment and consump-
tion all experienced a severe and prolonged contraction. Investment fell below trend
together with GDP at the start of the recession.5 Consumption remained above its
pre-recession level for another three quarters, then fell rapidly along with invest-
ment as the financial crisis intensified. By the trough in the first quarter of 2009,
detrended investment had fallen 25% from its peak, while detrended output fell 5%
and detrended consumption about 3%.6
Figure 1.2 shows the evolution of prices and interest rates during the same
time period. The figure shows inflation of the GDP deflator and the annualized
effective federal funds rate, both expressed in percentage terms. At the onset of
the recession and before 2008:Q3, inflation remained roughly around 2% while the
4My measure of consumption includes private personal consumption expenditure om non-
durable goods and services, whereas my measure of investment combines fixed private investment
and the private consumption of durable goods. Additional details on the data series are provided
in Section 1.5.2.
5Net exports did not contract until 2008:Q3. In fact, the value of total exported goods and
services increased 4.5% between 2007:Q3 and 2008:Q2, while imports declined 0.1%. During the
same period, government consumption increased 0.2% with respect to its pre-recession trend.
6In terms of levels, output fell by 7.3% from peak to through, consumption fell 5%, and in-
vestment fell 29%. Additional measures of economic activity also deteriorated sharply. Average
weekly hours fell by almost 2% and the civilian unemployment rate rose from 4.4% to 9.8%
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Figure 1.1: U.S. Great Recession: Macroeconomic Comovement























Notes: Output, consumption and investment are expressed in annualized real per-capita terms.
All series are detrended using the HP filter (λ = 1600) and normalized to 2007:Q3. The shaded
region indicates the NBER recession.
nominal interest rate fell from 4.75% to 2%. As economic conditions worsened
inflation fell rapidly and became negative in the first quarter of 2009. At the same
time the nominal interest fell below 0.20%, effectively reaching its lower bound.
There is no doubt that from 2007:Q3-2008:Q2 the U.S. economy was in a recession.
However up, to that point the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates can be dubbed
a plain vanilla recession. As is evident from both figures, from 2008:Q3 onward the
story changed substantially, with consumption turning around and quickly falling
below pre-recession levels, and investment contracting even at a faster rate. Trying
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to uncover the forces behind this latter period is challenging precisely because the
zero lower bound became binding.
Figure 1.2: Inflation and Interest Rates











































Notes: The shaded region indicates the NBER recession.
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1.3.1 Potential causes of the Great Recession
I present some informal discussion of the micro foundations for the investment
and preference shocks that play a central role in my results. I focus on these shocks
because the timing of the dramatic decline in consumption and investment shown
in Figure 1.1 points to the prominence of disruptions originating in the financial
sector of the economy. In addition, there is a long tradition in the ZLB literature,
in particular in small scale New Keynesian models without capital, that relies on
shocks to preferences as a simple mechanism to cause contractions in aggregate
demand and push the economy to the ZLB.
Preference shock. This type of shock affects the growth rate of aggregate
consumption through movements in the real interest rate that tilt the consumption
Euler equation.7 Where do these movements in the real interest rate come from?
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) provide a possible explanation based on tightening
of borrowing constraints. A sudden reduction in the debt limit forces household
near the constraint to reduce consumption and repay debt; the increased desire for
savings induced by precautionary motives puts downward pressure on the nominal
interest rate. From this perspective, a tightening of borrowing constraints in a
heterogeneous agent economy provides a rationale for an increase in the desire to
save and a reduction in the nominal interest rate that can be captured by shocks to
households’ preferences in the representative agent economy.
7A typical linearized Euler equation expressed in percentage deviations and assuming logarith-
mic utility is: ĉt+1 − ĉt = Et{R̂t − π̂t+1 + ε̂t+1}. Here εt are the shocks to households’ subjective
discount factor.
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Investment shock. With respect to shocks that distort the intertemporal
margin of capital accumulation there are various reduced form interpretations. For
example, Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010) and Justiniano, Primiceri and
Tambalotti (2011) document that a type of investment shock represented as a wedge
in the transformation of current investment into installed capital (marginal efficiency
of investment) is the main source of business cycle fluctuations, and they provide
evidence that such a shock played a significant role in the run-up to the Great
Recession. However, they cannot provide estimates of the investment shock after
2008:Q3 because their solution methods are unable to capture the ZLB constraint.
A shock to the marginal efficiency of investment can be interpreted as a disruption in
financial intermediation that affects the supply of capital and generates fluctuations
in its rate of return. Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010) point out that
a costly monitoring friction in the spirit of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) also gives
rise to a wedge that affects the transformation of investment into new capital. This
wedge looks similar to a shock that shifts the cost of adjusting investment, and the
authors interpret it as a disturbance that raises the cost of monitoring investment
projects. This observation is consistent with the large increase in corporate credit
spreads observed between 2008:Q1-2010:Q2, as documented by Gilchrist, Yankov
and Zakraǰsek (2009) and Gilchirst and Zakraǰsek (2012).
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1.4 The model
This section describes the model used for evaluating the macroeconomic dy-
namics observed during the Great Recession period. The model economy contains
several frictions that introduce nominal and real rigidities that have been shown to
be successful in capturing the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates (Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano, Prim-
iceri and Tambalotti (2010)). The frictions in the model include price rigidity in the
form of convex cost of price adjustment, habit formation in consumption, variable
capital utilization, and investment adjustment costs. The dynamics are driven by
exogenous shocks to the growth rate of technological progress, shocks to preferences,
shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment, a shock to aggregate demand in the
form of government purchases, and a shock to the monetary policy rule.
1.4.1 Households
Preferences. There is a representative household that consumes and supplies
labor Lt. Preferences are separable over consumption and labor (hours worked) and













The representative household maximizes expected discounted utility, where Et de-
notes the expectation operator conditional on information available in period t and
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β is the discount factor. The utility specification allows for external habits in con-
sumption, where the parameter h controls the strength of the habit. The utility
cost of labor is controlled by the term ψL, and ν represents the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. The term dt is an intertemporal shock that follows a
stationary first order autoregressive process
ln dt = ρd ln dt−1 + ε
d
t , with ε
d
t ∼ N(0, σ2d) (1.2)
The dt shock captures exogenous changes in the desire to increase or decrease con-
sumption in the present compared to the future, and in what follows I refer to it
simply as the preference shock.
Budget constraint. Households receive a nominal wage Wt as compensation
for the labor they supply to intermediate firms. The capital stock of the economy
K̄t−1 is owned by the households, who rent it to intermediate firms every period
in exchange for a nominal return Rkt . In addition to the quantity of capital rented
to firms, the household also chooses the intensity of capital utilization in the pro-
duction process, denoted by ut, such that the amount of capital that firms use to
produce is equal to Kt = utK̄t−1. A higher intensity of operation of the capital stock
entails a real cost for the household denoted by A(ut), expressed in terms of the
final consumption good. In addition to factor income, the representative household
collects interest from holding a one period risk-free nominal bond Bt−1 issued by the
government. This asset pays Rt−1 dollars in period t. In addition, the household
pays a lump sum tax Tt, and receives the profits generated by firms Πt. Income
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is allocated to consumption (Ct), investment (It) and the purchase of government
bonds issued in the current period (Bt). The aggregate price level in this economy
is Pt and the period budget constraint in nominal terms is therefore given by
PtCt + PtIt +Bt ≤ WtLt +Rkt utK̄t−1 − PtA(ut)K̄t−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 − Tt + Πt
(1.3)
Investment frictions. Investment decisions are subject to an adjustment cost
function S(.) and a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment µt. As in Jus-
tiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2011), I interpret this shock as a reduced form
representation of a friction that disturbs the process of financial intermediation and
affects the efficiency with which investment goods are transformed into capital:








The marginal efficiency of investment evolves according to the process
lnµt = ρz lnµt−1 + ε
µ
t , with ε
µ
t ∼ N(0, σ2µ) (1.5)
Let Ξt denote the multiplier associated with the capital accumulation equation and
Λt the multiplier associated with the budget constraint of the household. The op-
timal investment allocation implies that the relative price of installed capital in














+ (1− δ) Ξt+1
Pt+1Λt+1
}
The marginal efficiency of investment, µt, affects the transformation of current in-
vestment into installed capital directly through the capital accumulation equation
and also indirectly through Tobin’s Q, which affects the rate on return of capital.
Labor Supply. Labor services produced by the representative household are
sold to a perfectly competitive labor market at the aggregate nominal wage rate Wt.





The production side of the economy consists of perfectly competitive final good
producers that buy intermediate goods Yi,t from a continuum of firms that operate
in a monopolistically competitive market. The intermediate firms are indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1].
Final good producers. The final good firms buy intermediate inputs from
producers and aggregate the intermediate goods using a technology with constant
8The shock dt enters the intratemporal condition because it also affects the marginal disutility
of labor. This specification of the preference shock helps the model generate a positive correlation
between consumption and hours, to match business cycle facts without the need of a separate
shock to preferences for leisure. However, the equilibrium response of hours to the preference shock
depends on the wealth effects that the preference shocks generate through changes in consumption.
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elasticity of substitution to produce the consumption good Yt. Taking the prices of
inputs Pi,t and the price at which they sell the final good Pt as given, the final-good














where λp is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution across intermediate inputs,
which controls the steady state markup of price over marginal cost. The optimal







Intermediate-goods firms. Intermediate firms operate a technology that




1−α − AtF ifKαi,t (AtLi,t)1−α > AtF
0 otherwise
(1.7)
Here Ki,t and Li,t denote the firm’s demand for effective units of capital and com-
posite labor services respectively. At is an aggregate technology shock with growth
rate zt ≡ At/At−1. The growth rate zt follows an exogenous autoregressive process:
ln(zt/z) = ρz ln(zt−1/z) + ε
z
t , with ε
z
t ∼ N(0, σ2z) (1.8)
The term F represents a fixed cost that is calibrated to ensure zero profits in steady
state. The growth rate of technology along the balanced growth path is given by
z = γ.
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Marginal costs. Intermediate firms rent labor and capital in perfectly com-
petitive markets taking factor prices Wt and R
k















Because capital is traded in an economy-wide market, all intermediate producers
take as given the aggregate rental rate of capital Rkt . As a consequence the optimal
factor allocation depends only on aggregate prices, so that aggregation is straight-

















Price setting. Intermediate firms face a cost of adjusting prices in every period.
The cost is expressed as a fraction of firms’ revenue and is controlled by the convex
9Appendix A.1 shows that because optimal factor allocation is identical across firms, so are
marginal costs.
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function Φp(Pt/Pt−1). Taking the marginal cost MCt as given, each intermediate
























Monetary Policy. The monetary authority controls the short term interest
rate following an operational rule that responds to deviations of inflation with re-
spect to the central bank’s desired level of inflation and the gap of observed output
with respect to the non-stochastic level of output along the balanced growth path
of the economy, Y ∗. Based on the results in Aruoba, Cuba-Borda and Schorfheide
(2013), I do not consider equilibria with deflationary dynamics, and I let the cen-
tral bank’s desired level of long-run inflation coincide with the steady-state level of
inflation π∗ > 0.10 The main difference with respect to the standard analysis is that
















I assume that the response of the interest rate is smoothed with respect to the
previously observed nominal interest rate. The parameter ρR controls the speed of
10Aruoba, Cuba-Borda and Schorfheide (2013) find that during the Great Recession the U.S.
economy remained in a targeted-inflation regime where the steady-state level of inflation is positive.
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the adjustment, while εRt is a monetary policy shock, that is normally distributed
with mean zero and standard deviation σ2r .
Fiscal Policy. The government issues bonds Bt every period to satisfy its
flow budget constraint PtTt − PtGt = Rt−1Bt−1 − Bt. The term Gt is government






gt is an exogenous autoregressive process with mean ḡ = 1/(1− ζ):
ln(gt) = (1− ρg) ln ḡ + ρg ln(gt−1) + εgt , with εgt ∼ N(0, σ2g) (1.15)
Here, ζ is the government expenditure to GDP ratio in the steady state.
1.4.4 Market Clearing
The market clearing conditions for this economy are as follows. I consider a
symmetric price equilibrium, Pi,t = Pj,t = Pt ∀i, j ∈ [0, 1], that satisfies: (i) the
market for capital clears:
∫ 1
0
Ki,tdi = Kt, (ii) the market for labor services clear:∫ 1
0
Li,tdi = Lt (iii) Installed capital K̄t evolves according to (1.4), such that the






Yt = Ct + It +A(ut)K̄t−1 (1.16)
By Walras’ Law the market for government bonds clears if all other markets clear.
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1.4.5 Functional Forms
For estimation and the subsequent quantitative analysis I specify specific func-
tional forms for the price adjustment cost function Φ(.), the investment adjustment

































where φp and ξ are parameters that control the magnitude of the adjustment costs
of prices and investment. The parameter χ controls the curvature of the capacity
utilization function. The parameters ρ∗ and π∗ denote the steady state values of the
rental rate and the inflation rate respectively.
1.4.6 Equilibrium Conditions and Solution Strategy
The characterization of the equilibrium conditions of the model is relatively
standard and is relegated to Appendix A.1.1. The stochastic process for aggregate
technology At introduces a source of long-run growth in the model. The equilib-
rium conditions are transformed into a stationary representation by dividing all real
variables by the technology factor At and all nominal variables by the factor PtAt.
Further details are presented in Appendix A.1. In what follows small case letters
refer to detrended variables, e.g. xt ≡ XtAt .
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The computational strategy adopted in this paper relies on the concept of
Functional Rational Expectations Equilibrium (FREE) employed in Krueger and
Kubler (2004b) and Malin, Krueger and Kubler (2007). The idea consists of finding
a suitable set of functions defined over a compact set that satisfy the first order
equilibrium conditions of the model. More precisely, the equilibrium can be charac-
terized in terms of the five policy functions C = {L(S), q(S), λ(S), i(S), π(S)},which
correspond to hours worked, Tobin’s q, marginal utility of wealth, investment and
inflation, respectively.
The solution is assumed to be a time-invariant function of a minimum set of
state variables S. The state vector is formed by S =
[




where x−1 corresponds to the lagged value of the variable, x denotes its current
realization, and x′ denotes future realizations. In total the model has n = 9 state
variables. The choice of S is fundamental for the characterization of the equilibrium.
Because the ZLB creates a kink in the monetary policy rule, the model has two
steady states, opening the possibility of multiple equilibrium dynamics (i.e. the
control functions that satisfy the equilibrium conditions may not be unique). In
fact this is the case in Aruoba, Cuba-Borda and Schorfheide (2013), who show that
it is possible to construct a deflationary equilibrium and many non-fundamental
equilibria in which the state vector is augmented by an extraneous stochastic process
(a sunspot) that moves the equilibrium dynamics from the equilibrium with positive
inflation to the equilibrium with deflationary dynamics. They find no evidence that
the U.S. economy switched away from the target-inflation equilibrium during the
Great Recession. For this reason I focus solely on the targeted-inflation equilibrium
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in the quantitative analysis of section 1.5.
Definition 1 A FRE Equilibrium is defined by the compact set S ∈ Rn and the set

















{ρ(S′)u′ −A(u′) + (1− δ)q(S′)} (1.22)











− 1) [1− Φp(π(S))]−
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u = dA−1(ρ) (1.27)










k̄ = (1− δ) k̄−1
γez
+ µ [1− S(∆i)] i(S) (1.30)
















To simplify notation I use: ∆i = i(S)
i−1
ezγ, dΦp = ∂Φp(x)/∂x,dS = ∂S(x)/∂x
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The FRE Equilibrium definition requires the solution of an infinite dimensional
nonlinear system of equilibrium conditions in order to characterize the functions in
C(S). The solution strategy adopted here uses two approximations. First, the com-
pact state space S is represented using ergodic set methods as in Judd, Maliar and
Maliar (2012) and Aruoba, Cuba-Borda and Schorfheide (2013). This reduces the
problem to finding the best approximation to the true functions in C(S) using a
grid mi ∈ M ⊂ S, i = 1, . . . ,M , that represents the region of the state space
that is relevant to characterize the solution. Section 1.5.3 explains how to construct
this grid such that it contains enough nodes where the ZLB binds. Second, the
unknown equilibrium functions in C(j) ∈ C(S) are approximated by piece-wise con-
tinuous functions characterized by a set of coefficients θ ∈ R2×N . These coefficients
are used to construct linear combinations of basis functions Tj : S → R that are
evaluated in each solution node. In particular I use Chebyshev polynomials, de-
fined as Tj(x) = cos(j × arccos(x)), where x ∈ [−1, 1], which are combined using a
complete polynomial rule in order to form the multidimensional basis function Tj.11
Because I will look for an approximate solution to the functional equations
11Additional details of the construction of the basis functions is provided in section A.2.
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that satisfy the equilibrium conditions, a criterion that informs about how close
my approximation is to the “true” solution is needed.12 The metric for the ap-
proximation is given by a set of residual functions R(S) that are obtained from the
equilibrium conditions (1.20)-(1.24). For example, the residual for equation (1.20)
is:






Appendix A.2 explains how to construct all the residual functions used to solve the
nonlinear model. To evaluate the expectations that appear in the residual functions,
I use a sparse-grid approximation based on the integration rules discussed in Heiss
and Winschel (2006).
1.5.2 Parameter Estimation with Pre-ZLB data
Estimation of the model subject to the ZLB constraint is a computationally
intensive enterprise because it requires the nonlinear solution to be computed for a
large number of parameter vectors. Instead I follow a two-step procedure. First I es-
timate a log-linearized version of the model using data prior to the ZLB episode from
1984:Q1 - 2008:Q3. I estimate the model parameters using a first-order approxima-
tion of the DSGE model equilibrium conditions, and characterize the posterior dis-
tribution of the parameters using the Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
12Note here that because of the multiplicity of equilibria, constructing the approximate function
numerically requires an initial guess that converges to the desired equilibrium. It turns out that
using the decision rules of the linearized model as the initial guess, the nonlinear decision rule
converge to the dynamics of the equilibrium with positive steady state inflation.
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described in An and Schorfheide (2007). Conditional on the parameters obtained
from the pre-ZLB period, I solve the model enforcing the ZLB and use Sequential
Monte Carlo methods to extract the underlying states and shocks corresponding to
the period 2008:Q2 - 2013:Q4.
Some parameters are fixed before the estimation because the likelihood is
not informative with respect to them. The parameter ζ is set to 0.22 in order to
match the long-run average ratio of government consumption expenditure to Gross
Domestic Product observed in NIPA data from 1960-2013. The parameter λp is
fixed at 0.1667, implying a steady state price markup of 20%. This value is slightly
lower than that estimated in medium-scale DSGE models, which find a steady price-
markup of 28%. Since I do not use data on hours worked for estimation I set the
parameter ν = 1, implying a Frisch elasticity of labor supply equal to one. This
value is large with respect to the microeconomic evidence for this elasticity along
the intensive margin reported in Chetty et al. (2013). Nevertheless it is within the
range of estimated values obtained by Rios-Rull et al. (2012b). I normalize the
steady state level of hours worked to 1/3 using the parameter ψL.
Data. I use quarterly data on five macroeconomic variables covering the pe-
riod 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q3.13 I map the model variables to data on output growth,
consumption growth, investment growth, inflation and the nominal interest rate. I
use data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to measure output growth. Consump-
tion is the sum of personal consumption of non-durable goods (PCND) and services
13All the series were extracted from the FRB St. Louis FRED Database, with the original name
of the data series shown in parenthesis. Additional details are provided in section A.3.
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(PCND). Investment includes the personal consumption of durable goods (PCDG),
fixed private investment (FPI) and the change in inventories (CBI). All these series
are scaled by the civilian non-institutionalized population aged over sixteen years
(CNP16OV) and deflated using the implicit GDP price deflator (GDPDEF). Growth
rates are computed as one period log differences expressed in percentages. Inflation
is computed as the percentage log-difference of the implicit price deflator. Finally
the nominal interest rate is measured using the quarterly average of the Federal
Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS).
Table 1.1 presents parameter estimates based on the results of the MH sim-
ulator. I obtain 100,000 draws of parameters from the posterior distribution and
construct summary statistics of the posterior distribution based on the last 50,000
draws of the sequence. A few results from the estimation are discussed next. The
estimated value of the share of capital in the intermediate firms’ production function
is 0.18. In estimated DSGE models this parameter is usually below the commonly
used value of 0.33 obtained from long-run averages of the capital share in aggregate
output. With respect to the parameter h that controls the consumption habit and
the persistence of consumption with respect to nominal shocks, I obtain a value of
0.55. This degree of habit persistence is relatively modest compared to the most
recent estimates of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2014).
The parameter χ, which controls the elasticity of capacity utilization with re-
spect to the rental rate of capital, is an important parameter in determining the
persistence of inflation in response to demand shocks. There is wide range of varia-
tion in previous estimates of this parameter. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum
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and Evans (2005) assume a very small value of 0.01, whereas Justiniano, Primiceri
and Tambalotti (2010) obtain an estimate in the range of 3 to 7. My estimate for
χ is closer to the latter, implying that the rental rate is very sensitive to changes
in capacity utilization. This implies that, all else equal, marginal costs will respond
strongly to movements in capital utilization, making inflation less persistent and
also more volatile.
The parameter controlling nominal rigidities is an important one for the trans-
mission of shocks in the model and deserves additional attention. I estimate the
price adjustment cost parameter φp indirectly using the implied slope of the Phillips
curve κ(φp). The estimate of the slope of the Phillips curve is steep, with a value
of κ = 0.21 at the posterior mean. To give a sense of the degree of price stickiness
implied by the model, I compute the associated frequency of price adjustment in a
first order approximation of the Phillips curve derived under Calvo pricing. The esti-
mated value of κ implies that firms would adjust prices roughly every three quarters,
compared to the four to six quarters commonly obtained in the DSGE literature.
Nonetheless, the posterior credible set of the estimated Phillips curve parameter is
consistent with the wide range of values reported in Schorfheide (2008a).
I use informative priors to estimate the parameters of the monetary policy
rule. There is a significant amount of persistence in the determination of the interest
rate, reflected in the estimate of ρR. The response of the nominal rate to inflation is
within the range of estimated parameters in the literature. The output gap response
parameter seems low because the policy rule is expressed in terms of quarterly
percentage deviations of output with respect to its balanced growth path. The
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estimated parameters that control the growth rate of technology and the inflation
rate along the balanced growth path imply a long run rate of output growth of 2%
and a long run inflation rate of 2.3% in annualized terms.
Fit of the Estimated Model. The parameters were estimated using a
Bayesian framework, and to check the empirical fit of the model I report posterior
predictive checks. For this, I use simulated trajectories from the model and draws
from the posterior distribution of parameters to construct a set of statistics S(ỸT ) ∈
Rn. The same sample statistic can be constructed using observed data S(YT ). If
the observed sample statistic lies far in the tail of the predictive distribution, this
indicates that the model has trouble capturing the data along that dimension.
Figure 1.3 shows the posterior predictive checks for the empirical distribution
of four statistics S(ỸT ): the mean, standard deviation, first order autocorrelation
and the correlation with GDP growth.14 The posterior predictive checks reveal that
the estimated model captures well the mean of all the observed series except that of
investment growth. The reason is that neutral technology shocks are the only source
of long-run growth in the model economy. Hence all variables grow at the rate (γ)
along the balanced growth path. However, in the data investment has a different
long-run growth rate. A simple way to resolve this discrepancy is to introduce an
additional source long-run technological progress that only affects investment and
that can disentangle the long-run growth rate of both variables. With respect to
standard deviations and first order autocorrelations the DSGE model does well in
matching the empirical counterparts, although on average it tends to over predict the
14The algorithm used to construct the predictive distribution is discussed in Section A.2.5.
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Table 1.1: DSGE Model Parameters
Parameter Prior Posterior 90% Credible Sets Prior Prior SD
Description Mean Mean
h Habit persistence 0.5 0.5467 0.4582 0.6328 B 0.10
α Capital share 0.3 0.1806 0.1607 0.1991 N 0.05
ξ Inv. Adj. Cost 4.0 4.0491 2.5816 5.5861 G 1.00
χ Cap. Utilization Cost 5.0 5.2988 3.7511 6.9456 G 1.00
κ(φp) Phillips Curve 0.3 0.2127 0.0994 0.3262 G 0.20
Taylor Rule:
ρr Smoothing 0.5 0.7310 0.6756 0.7833 B 0.20
ψ1 Inflation Gap 1.5 1.6758 1.5299 1.8157 N 0.10
ψ2 Output Gap 0.005 0.0748 0.0297 0.1154 N 0.05
Shock Process:
ρz Persistence z shock 0.4 0.0933 0.0134 0.1669 B 0.20
ρg Persistence g shock 0.6 0.9886 0.9794 0.9983 B 0.20
ρµ Persistence µ shock 0.6 0.7000 0.5982 0.8117 B 0.20
ρd Persistence d shock 0.6 0.9475 0.9170 0.9829 B 0.20
100σz Std. Dev. z shock 0.2 0.9171 0.7333 1.1097 IG 1.00
100σg Std. Dev. g shock 0.5 0.2746 0.2428 0.3052 IG 1.00
100σµ Std. Dev. µ shock 0.5 3.8763 2.4248 5.3372 IG 1.00
100σd Std. Dev. d shock 0.2 1.2436 0.8029 1.6882 IG 1.00
100σr Std. Dev. ε
r shock 0.2 0.1746 0.1476 0.2004 IG 1.00
Balanced Growth Path:
γ(q) Long Run Growth 0.5 0.4978 0.4604 0.5343 N 0.025
π(q) Inflation Rate 0.5 0.5734 0.4302 0.7169 N 0.10
r(q) Discount rate 0.3 0.1848 0.1010 0.2646 G 0.10
Implied Parameters:
β Discount Factor 0.9982
φp Price Adj. Cost 15.1062
rr(q) Real rate 2.7255
Notes: The parameters were estimated using 1984:Q1-2008:Q3 data. The credible sets are
obtained from the 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution. r(q) = 100(β−1 − 1)
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autocorrelations. A similar picture emerges for the correlation with output growth.
Lastly the model tends to under predict the second moments of the nominal
interest rate. This could be explained if in practice the monetary authority responds
more strongly to periods of low economic activity compared to periods of high eco-
nomic activity. For example, in the face a negative output gap, the Fed may decide
to lower the nominal interest rate quickly. This would generate greater volatility
in the observed nominal interest rate but it would reduce its autocorrelation. Sim-
ilarly, when the economy is in a recovery, the Fed may decide not to increase the
nominal rate too quickly, to avoid halting the expansion. This would introduce a
higher autocorrelation in observed interest rates but it would lower its volatility. In
fact, Aruoba, Bocola and Schorfheide (2013) find evidence that supports the view
that the Fed adjusts the nominal interest rate asymmetrically. My specification of
the policy rule does not allow for such asymmetry, and hence the posterior predic-
tive distribution fails to account for these dynamics. Nonetheless, the estimated
model with pre-ZLB data captures important features of the dynamics of output,
consumption, investment, inflation and the nominal rate.
Taking as given the estimated parameters at their posterior mean, I now ex-
plain how to incorporate the ZLB into the solution of the model, which is the
backbone of the quantitative exercise of section 1.7.
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Figure 1.3: Posterior Predictive Checks




















First Order Autocorre lat ion






Corre lat ion with Output Growth
Notes: The red dot corresponds to the observed statistic. The dark-blue horizontal bar is the mean
of the simulated statistic. The light-blue bands correspond to the 5th and 95th percentiles of the
posterior predictive density.
1.5.3 Incorporating the Zero Bound
Before moving to the quantitative analysis, I solve the nonlinear model that
incorporates the zero bound. Using the computational strategy described in Sec-
tion 1.4.6 and the posterior mean of the parameters in Table 1.1, I approximate the
FRE equilibrium on a grid constructed using simulation based methods. As in Judd,
Maliar and Maliar (2012) I construct a representation of the ergodic set of the model
using a clustered grid algorithm. However, as emphasized in Aruoba, Cuba-Borda
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and Schorfheide (2013), the essential ergodic set does not capture events where the
ZLB is binding. Following their computational strategy, I augment the essential er-
godic set with grid points that capture binding ZLB periods in the U.S. experience
from 2009:Q1-2013:Q4. The additional grid points are obtained from the filtered
distribution of states during this period.15
Decision rules. The functional equations that characterize the equilibrium
dynamics during normal times when the ZLB is not binding (nb) and when the
ZLB is binding (b) are parameterized by the vector of unknown coefficients Θ =
{θL,r, θq,r, θπ,r, θλ,r, θi,r}, where r = {b, nb} denotes one of the two possible regimes
of the nominal interest rate.
I use piece-wise smooth functions as in Aruoba, Cuba-Borda and Schorfheide
(2013) because they provide a flexible approximation that allows each of the control
functions to inherit the kink induced by the zero bound constraint. For example,




θλ,nbj Tj(S) if R(S) > 1, j = 1, . . . , N
∑
θλ,bj Tj(S) if R(S) = 1, j = 1, . . . , N
(1.34)
A total of 2×N coefficients and basis functions are used to approximate the decision
rules over the grid of points M. The piece-wise smooth approximations consist of
using one set of coefficients θλ,nbj ∈ RN to approximate the functional equation in
the regions of the state space where the zero bound is not binding, while a second
15The construction of the filtering distributions is explained in Section 1.6.1, and additional
details are provided in section A.4.
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set of coefficients θλ,bj ∈ RN approximates the decision rule when the constraint is
active.
Using a third order approximation with a complete basis of Chebyshev poly-
nomials, each element of Θ contains N = 220 unknown coefficients; hence a total
of 2, 200 unknowns need to be solved numerically. The objective function that pins
down the unknown coefficients is given by the sum of squared residuals of the equi-
librium conditions R(S,Θ) evaluated at the M = 600 grid points, out of which 440
correspond to the essential ergodic set obtained from simulating the model, and the
remaining 160 points are obtained from the filtered states described previously. I
use a Newton-based solver to find the coefficients (Θ) that minimize
∑M
i=1R(Si,Θ)2.
Accuracy of nonlinear solution After obtaining the vector of coefficients
Θ, I check the accuracy of the solution using the bounded rationality measure from
Judd (1998), also known as Euler Equation errors. This approach scales the approx-
imation errors R(S,Θ) as a fraction of current consumption and expresses them in
terms of unit-free quantities. Table 1.2 shows a summary of the Euler error accuracy
measure computed for all residual functions. The average approximation error is on
the order of 10−3, which means that the representative agent’s loss from following
the approximate decision rules is 0.1 cents for every dollar spent.16
16Figure A.1 shows the full distribution of the Euler equation errors.
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Table 1.2: Euler Equation Errors
Euler Marginal Utility Capital Euler Investment Pricing
Equation of Wealth Equation Equation Equation
Mean -3.00 -2.63 -3.29 -2.82 -2.35
Min -6.14 -5.74 -5.33 -5.88 -5.52
Max -2.14 -1.70 -2.48 -1.80 -1.54
1.6 What Caused the Great Recession?
This section investigates the forces that explain the dynamics of quantities
and prices during the Great Recession. I use the implied equilibrium dynamics
of the model to match U.S. data from 2000:Q1 to 2013:Q4. A key challenge in
understanding the forces driving the events in the aftermath of the financial crisis
in 2008:Q3 is backing out the structural shocks that rationalize the data. This
is a complicated task because the presence of the ZLB renders the model highly
nonlinear.
Prior to the Great Recession, the vast majority of DSGE models ignored the
ZLB, because it seemed unlikely that the U.S. economy would ever face shocks large
enough to make this constraint binding.17 Without the ZLB, equilibrium dynam-
ics are well approximated with a linear state-space system, and the estimation of
structural innovations can be performed using the Kalman filter, for example as in
Bauer, Nicholas and Rubio-Ramirez (2003). In my application the structural inno-
vations are Gaussian but the ZLB causes the dynamics of the economy to be highly
17Assuming the ZLB away has the added benefit that linear approximations are enough to
characterize equilibrium dynamics, which allows the use of fast solution methods that open the
door for estimating medium scale DSGE models.
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nonlinear, which complicates inference about the underlying unobserved variables.18
I tackle the inference problem using Sequential Monte Carlo methods (SMC)
to numerically approximate the distribution of states that rationalizes the sequence
of observed output, consumption, and investment growth as well as inflation and the
nominal interest rate during the period 2008:Q3 - 2013:Q4.19 The exercise is similar
to Aruoba, Cuba-Borda and Schorfheide (2013) in terms of extracting the filtered
states and shocks, but in addition in this paper I use the estimated structural shocks
to perform counterfactual exercises about the evolution of observed macroeconomic
variables.
1.6.1 Inference of unobserved states
I briefly discuss the inference problem and sketch the mechanics of the filtering
algorithm used to estimate unobserved states in nonlinear models. The solution of
the system of equilibrium conditions of the model has the following nonlinear state-
space representation of the dynamics of the endogenous variables:
St = g (St−1, ut) , ut ∼ N(0,Σu) (1.35)
Yt = m(St) + εt, εt ∼ N(0,Σε), (1.36)
18An example of a New Keynesian model with a linear structure but with non-Gaussian inno-
vations is studied in Curdia, Del Negro and Greenwald (2013).
19Herbst and Schorfheide (2014) provide a detailed description of SMC methods, as well as
practical guidelines for implementing different algorithms.
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Where (1.35) is the transition equation that describes the evolution of the state
variables St as a function of the previous position of the system St−1, and the real-
ization of structural shocks ut. The relationship of observable variables to the model
state variables is given by the measurement equation (1.36), which is augmented by
disturbances εt, which represent measurement errors that may create a discrepancy
between the model implied series and their observed counterparts. I set the variance
of the measurement error in (1.36) to 10% of the sample variance in the observables.
The introduction of measurement error is not an arbitrary device to increase the
fit of the model; rather it is essential for the evaluation of the observation density
described below.
Consider st and yt as realizations generated by the nonlinear system. Let Y
t
denote a time series of observations from 1, . . . , t. The state-space system described
above induces an observation density p(yt|st, Y t−1) and a transition density denoted
p(st|st−1, Y t). The filtering problem consists of learning about the realizations of the
unobserved states and shocks {st, ut} given the sequence of observations Y t. In other
words, the objective is to characterize the shape of the filtering density p(st|Y t). In
a nutshell, SMC methods start with a discrete approximation of the filtering density










where Np is the number of particles, and use the information contained in the current
observation yt together with the state transition equation of the model to update the









such that the following ap-











For this particular application I set Np = 100, 000 particles and start the the ap-
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proximation to p(s0|Y 0) using simulations from the solution of the model.
1.6.2 What shocks explain the Great Recession?
I recover the structural shocks from the approximation of the filtering density
p(st|Y t). To illustrate, Figure 1.4 presents the mean of the filtered innovations
E(st|Y t) for t=2000:Q1 to t=2013:Q4, for the marginal efficiency of investment (εµ)
and the discount factor (εd).
20 Feeding these innovations, together with the filtered
endogenous states R−1, c−1, k̄−1, i−1, through the system (1.35) - (1.36) recovers the
observed evolution of consumption, investment and output, as well as the dynamics
of inflation and the nominal interest rate. With the exception of 2008:Q3, when
financial distress was at its highest, all the innovations are within two standard
deviations in both the pre and post recession periods.
Preference and Investment Shocks. From Figure 1.4 can be seen that the
economic downturn during the Great Recession is associated with a combination of
negative shocks to consumption and investment. The sequence of negative shocks
started in the second half of 2007 and continued through the second half of 2008,
up to this point, these shocks were no different in magnitude to those observed in
previous periods. This suggests that early on the Great Recession started as regular
downturn episode accompanied by a build-up of frictions affecting financial interme-
diation prior to the financial crisis. Prior to 2008:Q3, the negative investment shocks
capture the decline in consumption of durable goods and investment in residential
20For technology and government expenditure I show the path of their time series process later
in the section.
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structures, which were the components of aggregate demand that were affected by
the deterioration in the housing market at the onset of the recession.
Figure 1.4: Structural Innovations






















Financial CrisisShocks to investment
Shocks to consumption
Notes: The solid blue line is constructed as E(µt|Y t)− ρµE(µt−1|Y t). Similarly the dashed green
line is computed as E(dt|Y t)− ρdE(dt−1|Y t). The gray areas indicate NBER recession dates.
In the third quarter of 2008, a combination of negative shocks to the marginal
efficiency of investment and households’ discount factors are necessary to explain the
contraction in macroeconomic aggregates. Both shocks are larger than two standard
deviations, with the shock to preferences larger than then shock to the marginal
efficiency of investment. The size of the shocks after 2008:Q3 imply that the forces
that pushed the economy into the trough and triggered a binding zero lower bound
were unusual given the structure of the model. What is more interesting is the
timing of both shocks, because the model needs to account for both the contraction
in investment and consumption to generate the sharp decline in demand leading to
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the -10% contraction of output growth in the last quarter of 2008. Given that the
estimated preference shock is larger, one might conclude that this shock is the leading
explanation of the Great Recession. However, as will be discussed in section 1.7,
shocks to investment have a larger role in accounting for the contraction of output.
In general the New Keynesian model studied in this paper generates ZLB
episodes infrequently, about 0.1% of the time in the ergodic distribution. Because
the ZLB happens so rarely, the model requires large initial impulses to generate
a large enough decline in economic activity to explain the observed low interest
rates in the data. In models without capital, explaining such an event requires
even larger innovations of the structural shocks. For example, Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2012b) an eight standard deviation shock to the discount factor generate a
ZLB episode of four quarters. Similarly Gust, Lopez-Salido and Smith (2012b), using
a small New Keynesian model without capital, explain the decline in output and
the prolonged ZLB episode using a negative shock to households’ discount factor of
roughly five standard deviations. From an ex-ante perspective, the combination of
shocks that generates the ZLB event in my model has a probability of (0.0001%).21
Compared to a single shock of five standard deviations, my results are not very
different in terms of the extreme nature of the initial impulses. However, as I
discuss next, trying to match the decline in consumption and investment using only
shocks to preferences would be impossible.
Why are shocks to both preferences and investment necessary to explain the
21This corresponds to the probability of drawing a negative 2.1σεµ and a negative 2.6σεd , which
are the shocks that deliver the ZLB episode of 2009:Q1.
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data starting in 2008:Q3? The reason is that in models with capital, preference
shocks alone trigger wealth effects that generate negative comovement between con-
sumption and investment. This is illustrated in Figure 1.5, where I plot impulse
responses to preference and investment shocks away from the ZLB. In 2008:Q2, be-
fore the financial crisis unfolded, the Federal Funds rate was 2.1%. Because negative
preference shocks shift output away from consumption towards investment, while
negative shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment produce the opposite effect,
the model cannot match simultaneously the decline in both components of aggregate
demand with a single large shock.
Figure 1.5 highlights the counterfactual response in investment following nega-
tive preference shocks.22 To further illustrate this point, I use the particle filter and
U.S. data to calculate the marginal contribution to the log-likelihood of each of the
observations in the period 2007:Q4-2009:Q1 for two different specifications of the
model. First, I shut down the investment shock while keeping the other parameters
at their estimated values. I then repeat this exercise shutting down the preference
shock.23. Table 1.3 presents the results of this exercise. A more negative number
indicates a worse fit of the model for a given observation. Note that in all periods
trying to explain the data with investment shocks or preference shocks alone wors-
ens the likelihood. Early in the recession, from 2007:Q4-2008:Q2, the model without
the preference shock performs better than the model without the investment shock.
22Resolving the comovement problem remains a challenge for DSGE models. This issue was
originally pointed out by Barro and King (1984).
23Specifically in the first experiment σµ = 0.0001, while for the second experiment σd = 0.0001.
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Notes: The dark blue lines correspond to the impulse responses of the nonlinear model. The light
blue shade denote the 20%-80% confidence interval. The red dashed lines are obtained from the
linear solution of the model ignoring the ZLB. All impulse responses correspond to a one standard
deviation shock.
The reason is that early in the recession there was a slight increase in consump-
tion but a decline in investment (see Figure 1.1), so one shock is enough to match
both dynamics. In 2008:Q3, however, both investment and consumption plunged,
so trying to match the decline in both variables with a single shock is impossible,
as illustrated by the sharp deterioration in the log-likelihood.
Technology shocks Figure 1.6 shows the comparison between the filtered
innovations to technology (zt) and their directly measured counterpart using quar-
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Table 1.3: Marginal Contribution to the Log-Likelihood
Baseline Without Preference Without Investment
Shock Shock
2007:Q4 -1.6 -1.4 -9.6
2008:Q1 -4.8 -3.6 -43.4
2008:Q2 -3.2 -12.3 -24.3
2008:Q3 -6.0 -8.9 -34.8
2008:Q4 -33.4 -207.2 -149.6
2009:Q1 -10.6 -70.7 -121.7
terly data on total factor productivity (TFP) for the U.S. business sector.24 The
correlation between the filtered and observed measure of technology shocks is 0.52,
and there is also a clear negative TFP shock in 2008:Q4 observed in the data.
Why is a large negative technology shock necessary to explain the data starting
in 2008:Q4? The reason is the absence of persistent deflation in the data. When the
ZLB is binding, prices fall due to a self-reinforcing loop of high real interest rates,
declining marginal costs and low aggregate demand, so explaining the absence of a
more severe deflation in the U.S. remains a puzzle. After 2008:Q3, inflation turned
negative only in the first two quarters of 2009, bouncing back to positive territory
thereafter.
Although inflation has remained below the Federal Reserve’s target of 2% in
the aftermath of the recession, the U.S. economy has avoided a deflationary spiral.
24This measure is produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and methodological
details are presented in Fernald (2012). I fit an AR(1) process with drift to the quarterly growth
rate of observed TFP, exactly as in the description of the model, and report the fitted residuals.
45
The negative TFP shocks observed in the data explain in part why prices did not fall
more dramatically and persistently as the economy approached the ZLB. Negative
technology shocks increase marginal costs, counteracting the deflationary pressures
at the ZLB, and if the shocks are negative enough it is possible to reproduce inflation
and align the model prediction with the data.
Figure 1.6: Filtered and Directly Measured Innovations to TFP





















Notes: The dashed green line is the direct measure of technology shocks are obtained from the
TFP series discussed in Fernald (2012). The solid blue line is the mean filtered state zt obtained
from E(st|Y t). The gray areas indicate NBER recession dates.
Using a different time series representation for technology growth, Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2014) also rationalize the absence of deflation assuming
a one-time negative productivity shock in 2008:Q3. My estimates of the unobserved
technology shocks (zt) square well with those obtained from direct measurement of
TFP. The advantage of my filtering procedure is that I let the data speak through
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the model to recover the shocks more transparently. For instance I do not need to
assume the size of the negative technology shock in 2008:Q3, or that it has to be
a one-time innovation in that particular period. The fact that this is actually the
case is a result I obtain from the estimation.
Fiscal and monetary policy shocks. Figure 1.7 shows estimated shocks
to government spending. Two positive shocks in 2009:Q1 and 2009:Q2 and a large
negative shock in 2011:Q2 stand out. These events correspond to well-identified
events related to changes in discretionary fiscal expenditures. The positive shocks
correspond to the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, which was enacted
quickly after the collapse in the financial sector.25 The negative shocks observed
from 2010:Q4 and continuing until 2012:Q3 correspond to the prolonged struggle
about the stance of fiscal policy between the White House and Congress. Examples
of this struggle include the 2010 year-end debate about extending tax cuts and
federal unemployment benefits, the fiscal entrapment surrounding the Federal debt
limit in the first half of 2011, the downgrade in the credit rating of U.S. federal
government debt in August 2011, and concerns about the fiscal cliff in early 2013.
To emphasize that the recovered filtered shocks capture the developments in
actual U.S. fiscal policy, Figure 1.7 compares the filtered model estimate of gt to
a direct measure of the government spending shock based on the observed ratio
of government consumption and investment to GDP. The empirical measure of gt
is recovered using the same equation that describes the evolution of government
25The “stimulus bill” was signed into law in February 17, 2009, less than a month after the
change in U.S. presidential administration.
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The correlation between the empirical measure of gt and the filtered measure is
roughly 0.7.26 Fiscal policy was clearly expansionary from 2009:Q1 until 2011:Q2,
and tightened afterwards. As shown in section 1.7, this fiscal swing had a negative
effect on the economic recovery.
Figure 1.7: Fiscal Policy Shocks: Filtered vs Data






















Notes: The dashed green line corresponds to the empirical measure of the gt process. The solid
blue line is the mean filtered state gt obtained from E(st|Y t). Data on government consumption
and gross investment used to construct gt comes from Table 1.1.5 of the National Income and
Product Accounts. The gray areas indicate NBER recession dates.
26Note that I do not use the share of government consumption Gt/Yt when estimating the filtered
shocks. I use only the same data on consumption, investment and GDP growth. Nevertheless,
the sequence of filtered gt shocks tracks well its data counterpart. The latter is constructed using
quarterly information on government consumption and expenditure including gross investment.
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Figure 1.8 show the sequence of estimated monetary policy shocks. From
2007:Q3 onward, the estimated monetary policy shocks εr are negative. From
2007:Q3 onward these shocks reflect an aggressive response by the Federal Reserve
to counteract contractions in aggregate demand. However, once the economy hit
the ZLB in 2009:Q1, the continued sequence of negative monetary policy shocks has
a more subtle interpretation.
Figure 1.8: Estimated Monetary Policy Shocks























Notes: The solid blue line is the mean filtered state εrt obtained from E(st|Y t).
In December 2008, the Federal Open Market Committee adopted a language
that suggested an active policy decision of maintaining the nominal interest near
zero for a substantial period of time.27 The FOMC adopted more explicit language
in 2011:Q3, when it announced that the federal funds rate would likely remain at
27For instance, the first FOMC statement of 2009 indicates that “economic conditions are likely
to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time.”
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zero until mid-2013. In 2012:Q1 the reference date for the forward guidance policy
was extended until late 2014. My model does not take into account the shift towards
an explicit forward guidance policy. However, the negative monetary policy shocks
obtained after 2009:Q1, and in particular during the period 2011:Q3-2013:Q4, reflect
the commitment of the Federal Reserve to maintain a zero interest rate policy even
if the monetary policy rule would otherwise have called for an earlier lift-off in the
nominal rate.
The path for the estimated monetary policy shocks is consistent with Woodford
(2011)’s notion of monetary policy accommodation which means that the central
bank does not tighten policy in response to increased government purchases. In
Section 1.7.2 I show that monetary policy was accommodative enough to generate
a substantial output increase in response to the fiscal stimulus, in particular during
the period 2009:Q1-2010:Q1.
1.6.3 Interpreting the structural shocks
To complement the evidence presented in the previous section I compare the
filtered shocks with some direct measures of the underlying financial frictions that
caused the recession. Instead of focusing on the filtered innovations, εµt and ε
d
t ,
these sequences are transformed into the implied paths of the marginal efficiency of
investment µt and the subjective discount factor adjusted by the preference shock,
β̃ = β dt
dt−1
. The latter reflects the effective level of patience or impatience of indi-
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viduals ex-post and is related to households’ desire to save.28 To aid interpretation,
I compare the path of the marginal efficiency of investment to the observed evolu-
tion of credit spreads, and the path of the adjusted discount factor to the observed
evolution of the U.S. personal savings rate.
Figure 1.9 compares the paths of the marginal efficiency of investment (in-
verted scale) and credit spreads. The measure of credit spreads comes from the cor-
porate bond spread measure constructed by Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012) (GZ).29
Both the marginal efficiency of investment and the credit spreads data are scaled in
terms of standard deviations to plot them on the same scale.
As credit spreads rose with the onset of the recession, the marginal efficiency of
investment declined. In fact, in 2007:Q3, µt was near its steady state of zero. During
the first three quarters of the recession, from 2007:Q4 to 2008:Q2, the marginal
efficiency of investment declined about 6% below its steady state, and eventually
fell 12% below its steady state by 2009:Q1. The spike in the observed cost of
borrowing for nonfinancial firms in this period coincides with the deterioration of the
estimated marginal efficiency of investment. The tight correlation (-0.84) between
the filtered marginal efficiency of investment and credit spreads is a strong signal
that the investment shock I recover from the model captures disruptions in credit
markets. Following the end of the recession, credit spreads declined and the marginal
28To derive this object, use equation (1.20) and assume that the habit persistence parameter is





29The GZ spread measure is constructed using secondary market prices of senior unsecured fixed
coupon corporate bonds of U.S. nonfinancial firms. Compared to the simple measure of Baa-Aaa
corporate bond spreads, it has the advantage that it adjusts for the duration mismatch between
the cash flow of corporate bonds and the risk-free security.
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efficiency of investment recovered. However, the financial frictions remained at levels
that continued to depress aggregate demand. After 2009:Q1, the marginal efficiency
of investment remained around 5.0% below its steady state.
Figure 1.9: Marginal Efficiency of Investment and Credit Spreads


































Filtered MEI (Inverted Scale, RHS)
Notes: The dashed green line corresponds to the credit spread measure of Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek
(2012). The solid blue line is the mean filtered state, µt, obtained from E(st|Y t). All series are
standardized. The gray areas indicate NBER recession dates.
As discussed above, another possible cause of the Great Recession that has
received considerable attention is the tightening of borrowing constraints for house-
holds. For instance, Mian and Sufi (2012) favor this view as the leading cause of
the economic collapse. In my model it is not possible to capture household borrow-
ing and lending because of the representative agent structure. However, the shock
to preferences serves as a stand in for deeper frictions that cause agents to reduce
leverage, causing a contraction in aggregate consumption.
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Notes: The personal savings rate is defined as the ratio of personal savings to disposable personal
income obtained from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The solid blue line is the mean
filtered state, β̃t, constructed from E(st|Y t). The gray areas indicate NBER recession dates.
To illustrate this point, Figure 1.10 plots the adjusted discount factor against
the U.S. personal savings rate. A value of the adjusted discount factor above β =
0.9981 indicates an increased desire to save by households, driven by negative shocks
to dt. I interpret an increase in the adjusted discount factor above β as a tightening
of borrowing constraints. The measure of the savings rate I use is the ratio of
personal saving to disposable personal income. The adjusted discount factor tracks
the increase in the personal savings rate, which jumped from 2.3% prior to the start
of the recession to 7% by the end of the episode.
A possible objection to interpreting the preference shock as a reduced form
measure of tightening borrowing constraints is that the increase in the personal
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savings rate could have been driven by a faster decline in disposable income that
did not affect borrowing limits directly. This was unlikely to be the case. Table 1.4
shows the evolution of households’ stock of debt using the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York Consumer Credit Panel data. Total debt peaked in 2008:Q3 at 12.7
trillion dollars, and declined continuously from that point on. The first row shows
the year-over-year change in the stock of debt. The second row shows the cumulative
growth with respect to 2008:Q3. The reduction in debt in the data coincides with
the increase in households’ estimate of the adjusted discount factor. This provides
further support to the interpretation given to this shock.
Table 1.4: Evolution of Households’ Stock of Debt
2008:Q3 2008:Q4 2009:Q4 2010:Q4 2011:Q4
Annual change (%) 4.47 2.41 -3.98 -3.72 -1.51
% Change from 2008:Q3 - -0.04 -4.02 -7.59 -8.98
Notes: Data comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel, Brown
et al. (2010).
1.6.4 How much amplification does the ZLB generate?
Because the feedback response of the nominal interest rate is hampered when
the economy reaches the ZLB, the equilibrium dynamics of all other endogenous
variables change substantially. The max operator in equation (1.14) generates a non-
differentiability in all decision rules around the region where the ZLB binds. How
much do these non-linearities affect the inference about the causes of the Great
Recession? To illustrate this point I extract an alternative set of shocks using a
linearized version of the model that ignores the ZLB, and compare them with those
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obtained from the non-linear model.
Figure 1.11: Amplification due to the ZLB




























Notes: The solid blue line is the mean filtered state, µt, constructed from E(µt|Y t). The dashed
green line is the analog from the Kalman filter. The gray areas indicate NBER recession dates.
Figure 1.11 shows the time path of the marginal efficiency of investment es-
timated using the Kalman filter in the linearized version of the model, compared
with the baseline results obtained with the particle filter. Prior to the ZLB period
that starts in 2009:Q1 the estimated shocks from the linear and non-linear model
are similar. However once the economy hits the ZLB, the estimated shocks in the
nonlinear model are consistently smaller in absolute value. Because of the kinks in




This section analyzes the effect of structural shocks on macroeconomic dynam-
ics, with a focus on the Great Recession and its aftermath (2008:Q3 to 2013:Q4). I
use the model solution and the filtered states to construct counterfactual responses
of output, consumption, investment, the nominal rate and inflation, and compare
them to their realized values. The counterfactual exercises that follow answer three
questions: What caused the ZLB to bind? What was the contribution of each shock
to aggregate demand? and How much did fiscal and monetary policy helped during
the economic recovery?
Constructing counterfactual paths. I briefly explain the algorithm used
to construct the counterfactual paths. The first step is to recover the mean of
the filtering density s̄t = Ep(st|Y t). Feeding the path s̄t into (1.36), then I can
reconstruct the observed U.S. time series. The counterfactual paths are constructed
according to the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1 Counterfactual Paths
1. Construct the posterior mean (s̄t) of the state vector s̄t = E(st|Y t)2013:Q42008:Q2, using
the particle approximation of p(st|Y t).
2. The actual data path Yt can be reconstructed by feeding {s̄t}2013:Q42008:Q2 into equa-
tion (1.35) and equation (1.36).
3. The counterfactual path Ỹit is constructed by setting {εit = 0}2013:Q42008:Q2 ∈ s̄t, for a
subset of shocks i ⊂ {µ, d, z, g, R}
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1.7.1 What drove and kept the economy at the ZLB?
As already discussed in Section 1.6.2, the initial force that pushed the economy
to the ZLB and a deep recession was a combination of large negative investment and
preference shocks. To assess the importance of each of these impulses, Figure 1.12
feeds specific combinations of the filtered shocks through the model measurement
equation from 2008:Q3 onward.
The top panel shows that neither shocks to preferences nor shocks to the
marginal efficiency of investment alone can independently push the U.S. economy
into a liquidity trap. This result follows from the comovement problem illustrated
earlier. For example, in response to a negative shock to the discount factor, house-
holds reduce consumption. But because the capital accumulation margin is not
directly distorted by the preference shock, investment increases. The higher in-
vestment pushes aggregate demand upward and hence the feedback rule calls for
an increase in the nominal rate. The bottom panel shows that the combination of
investment and preference shocks pushed the economy to the ZLB in the model,
following closely the observed path of the nominal interest rate in the data. If only
these two shocks are present, the nominal rate turns effectively zero in 2009:Q2, and
remains at the ZLB for a year until 2010:Q2. Afterwards, the nominal rate rises
consistent with the mean reversion of the processes for µt and dt and the associated
economic recovery. However, the economic slump caused by the shocks that took
place around the financial crisis was large and persistent.
The figure also shows an experiment in which monetary policy shocks are also
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Investment + preference + monetary policy
Notes: The shaded region indicates the NBER recession. The vertical dashed line corresponds to
the start of the counterfactual exercise in 2008:Q3.
fed into the simulation. The simulated economy is at the ZLB starting in 2009:Q2
and monetary shocks initially have no effect. As aggregate demand picks up during
the recovery, the Federal Reserve uses the unanticipated shocks to the feedback rule
to keep the nominal interest rate pegged at zero from 2010:Q3 onward. The model
cannot account for unconventional policies that were implemented in response to
the financial meltdown, in particular forward guidance that used the language of
FOMC announcements to signal future monetary policy actions. However the fact
the nominal rate stayed at the ZLB after the economy started to recover indicates
monetary policy actions were indeed expansionary.
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Another important element that is not considered in the above experiments is
fiscal policy. An increase in government expenditure puts upward pressure on infla-
tion and would ordinarily trigger an hike in the nominal rate. When the nominal
interest rate adjusts to changes in government expenditure, fiscal policy is less effec-
tive in stimulating the economy (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011a)).
By committing to keep the nominal interest rate close to the ZLB, the Federal Re-
serve increased the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus. This explains why the estimated
sequence of monetary policy shocks is negative during and after the Great Recession.
1.7.2 Response of Aggregate Demand
What explain the dynamics of consumption and investment during and after
the Great Recession? To answer these questions I construct the counterfactual paths
implied by shutting only the i − th shock and then compare the simulated paths
from the model with the data. In terms of the notation in algorithm 1, the difference
between Yt and Ỹit measures the contribution of the ith structural innovation to the
evolution of the observed time series. In both the model and the data I use the
level of the series instead of the growth rates and use the Hodrick-Prescott filter
to extract their cyclical component. Figure 1.13 shows consumption data and its
counterfactual paths, all expressed in percentage deviations with respect to their
pre-recession values. Each panel corresponds to an experiment in which only the
indicated shock is shut down.
Panel (b) and (c) show that the decline in consumption can be attributed
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mostly to technology and preference shocks, with the latter playing a more impor-
tant role and highlighting the importance of shocks affecting households borrowing
ability during the recession. Nonetheless, technology shocks have a significant role in
consumption dynamics. The estimated negative technology shock in 2008:Q4 tends
to reduce consumption through wealth effects on labor supply but also through
households’ intertemporal margin because it increases current and future inflation.
The latter translates into a reduction in the real interest rate, stimulating consump-
tion through intertemporal substitution. Panel (c) reveals that the contractionary
effect dominates making the observed contraction in consumption more pronounced
in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
Panel (a) shows that investment shocks played almost no role in accounting
for the decline in consumption. Once again this disconnect is a reflection of the
comovement problem. Meanwhile, panel (d) shows the fiscal stimulus during the
period 2009-2011 had small crowding out effects on private consumption. At the
ZLB the additional inflation caused by increased government expenditure lowers
the real interest rate, thus potentially increasing private consumption. The counter-
factual exercise shows that consumption would have decreased an additional 0.5%
on average during 2009, had it not been for the stimulative effect of government
expenditure on inflation.
Figure 1.14 shows a similar counterfactual exercise for investment. The differ-
ences are starker. Panel (a) shows that the dominant force explaining the decline
in investment is the deterioration in the marginal efficiency of investment. The pro-
tracted recovery in the aftermath of the recession is due to the persistence of shocks
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Figure 1.13: Counterfactual Paths - Consumption








(a) No investment shock
Data
Counterfactual








(b) No preference shock








(c) No technology shock








(d) No fiscal shock
Notes: All series are detrended using the HP filter (λ = 1600) and normalized to 2007:Q3. The
shaded region indicates the NBER recession. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the start of
the counterfactual exercise in 2008:Q3.
affecting investment allocations, as captured by the filtered estimates of µt, which
remained below trend throughout. Contrary to the effects on consumption, gov-
ernment expenditure did have a mild crowding out effect on aggregate investment.
This presents a trade-off for the effectiveness of fiscal policy during a liquidity trap
that cannot be appreciated in New Keynesian models without investment. The eco-
nomic reason for this effect is that higher government expenditure does not reduce
the excess return between risky capital and risk-free bonds, which is driven by the µt
process. By lowering the real rate, increased government spending shifts resources
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Figure 1.14: Counterfactual Paths - Investment









(a) No investment shock
Data
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(b) No preference shock









(c) No technology shock









(d) No fiscal shock
Notes: All series are detrended using the HP filter (λ = 1600) and normalized to 2007:Q3. The
shaded region indicates the NBER recession. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the start of
the counterfactual exercise in 2008:Q3.
away from already low levels of investment towards consumption, worsening the
economic downturn.
Figure 1.15 is the key counterfactual exercise. It shows the overall effect of
the different shocks on the dynamics of output. I focus on two results. Panel (a)
shows that the contribution of investment shocks to output was substantial. The
financial frictions captured by the investment shock caused a significant contraction
of output. Absent the sharp decline in the marginal efficiency of investment, output
would have been almost 2% higher in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The
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Figure 1.15: Counterfactual Paths of Output









(a) No investment shock
Data
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(c) No technology shock











(d) No fiscal shock
Notes: All series are detrended using the HP filter (λ = 1600) and normalized to 2007:Q3. The
shaded region indicates the NBER recession. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the start of
the counterfactual exercise in 2008:Q3
second result is illustrated in panel (d). Expansionary fiscal policy had a positive
effect on output. For example, absent fiscal policy in 2009:Q2 output would have
contracted an additional 2.5%. From 2009-2011 the effects of fiscal policy helped
reduce the magnitude of the economic contraction by between a third and a half.
The contribution of preference shocks is milder, as evidenced by panel (b). The
reason is that the bulk of the contraction in output is accounted for by the decline
in investment, which can be explained mostly by the negative marginal efficiency
of investment shock. This is despite the fact that in 2009:Q2 the innovation to
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households’ preferences (εd) was twice as large as the innovation to the marginal
efficiency of investment (εµ).
Figure 1.16 shows the counterfactual paths of aggregate demand without mon-
etary policy shocks. The estimated monetary policy shocks during this period were
negative and kept the nominal interest rate at the ZLB. Panel (a) shows that absent
such monetary stimulus, output would have contracted almost an additional 0.5% in
2009:Q2 followed by a slower recovery. Panels (b) and (c) shows that the absence of
monetary accommodation reverses the effect of the fiscal expansion mostly through
a crowding out of private consumption while investment remains almost unaltered.
Figure 1.16: Effect of Monetary Policy on Aggregate Demand

































Notes: All series are detrended using the HP filter (λ = 1600) and normalized to 2007:Q3. The
shaded region indicates the NBER recession. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the start of
the counterfactual exercise in 2008:Q3
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1.7.3 Where did the deflation go?
A puzzle that continues to generate debate among macroeconomists is the
absence of persistent deflation during and after the Great Recession. As noted by
Hall (2011), any model that delivers a Phillips curve equation relating prices to
some measure of economic activity (e.g. unemployment or marginal costs) would
predict persistent deflation when there is substantial slack in the economy. However,
despite the severity of the Great Recession, inflation has for the most part remained
positive. Figure 1.17 shows different counterfactual paths for inflation constructed
using algorithm 1. I focus only on the shocks that would have predicted deflation.
Figure 1.17: Counterfactual Paths of Inflation























No monetary policy shock
No technology shock
No fiscal shock
Notes: Inflation is measured by the annualized quarterly percentage change in the GDP deflator.
The shaded region indicates the NBER recession. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the start
of the counterfactual exercise in 2008:Q3.
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The counterfactuals show that fiscal and monetary policy helped prevent a
sustained decline in prices. The negative technology shock helped reduce the defla-
tionary pressures in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, but thereafter it
was mostly the stimulative effect of fiscal and monetary policy on aggregate demand
that kept inflation on positive terrain. Del Negro, Giannoni and Schorfheide (2015)
offer an alternative explanation of the deflation puzzle based on estimates of nominal
rigidities that imply a very slow frequency of price adjustment.30 In comparison,
my results complement the findings of Aruoba, Cuba-Borda and Schorfheide (2013)
calling attention to the role of policies that helped avoid the perils of a switch to an
equilibrium with deflationary dynamics.
1.7.4 Role of nominal rigidities
I resolve the model increasing the value of the parameter φp that controls
the cost of price adjustment. The new value of φp implies a slope of the Phillips
curve of κ(φp) = 0.041, which is close to the degree of nominal price rigidity esti-
mated in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2014) and Justiniano, Primiceri
and Tambalotti (2010).
The main difference is the balance between the contribution of technology and
preference shocks. With prices that adjust less frequently, one can mechanically
account for the mild decline in inflation observed in the data without relying on large
negative technology shocks. If anything, increasing the degree of nominal rigidity
30Del Negro, Giannoni and Schorfheide (2015) augment the Smets and Wouters (2007) model
with financial frictions and find that the degree of nominal rigidities is stronger when they use
credit spread data to identify the structural parameters of the model.
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helps the model fit better the dynamics of inflation around the Great Recession.
With higher nominal rigidities, consumption becomes even more responsive to shocks
to preferences. But the degree of nominal rigidity does not substantially affect the
contribution of investment shocks in explaining the contraction and slow recovery
of output.
1.8 Conclusions
In this paper I examine the potential causes of the U.S. Great Recession and
the subsequent slow recovery through the lens of a medium scale New Keynesian
model subject to the Zero Lower Bound constraint. Using Sequential Monte Carlo
Methods, I recover the shocks and unobservable states that caused the Great Re-
cession. I find that the recession started with a decline in the marginal efficiency of
investment, reflecting frictions in the process of financial intermediation. When the
financial crisis unfolded in 2008:Q3, these frictions were exacerbated, pushing the
economy to the ZLB.
To explain the economy’s dynamics prior and during the recession, the model
relies on disturbances to the marginal efficiency of investment and households’ sub-
jective discount factor. Both shocks are necessary to explain why the economy
reached the liquidity trap, although shocks to the marginal efficiency of invest-
ment are more important overall. In particular, the persistent deterioration in the
marginal efficiency of investment played the dominant role in explaining the slow re-
covery. Absent the negative shocks to investment from 2008:Q3 onward, investment
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would have contracted about 45% less than it actually did. Moreover, investment
would have recovered faster, returning to its pre-recession levels by mid-2010.
Discretionary government expenditure provided substantial stimulus to reduce
the severity of the recession. Government consumption helped sustain aggregate
demand, and with the economy at the ZLB the fiscal stimulus helped avoid a defla-
tionary spiral. Monetary policy also helped stimulate the economy by keeping the
nominal interest rate at the ZLB even after the frictions affecting consumption and
investment started to subdue. However, the impasses between the White House and
Congress with regard to the long-run outlook of fiscal policy generated a slowdown
and held back the economic recovery from 2011 onward.
In this paper I attempt to bridge the gap between the solution of quantitative
models with a ZLB constraint and medium-scale DSGE models commonly used for
the study of business cycles and policy analysis. Solving this class of models is
important to understanding the joint dynamics of aggregate demand, inflation and
a nominal interest rate that is subject to the ZLB constraint. I leave extensions,
such as the study of different price setting mechanisms to better understand the
dynamics of inflation, and the importance of explicit financial frictions when the
economy is at the ZLB, for future research.
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Chapter 2 Macroeconomic Dynamics Near the ZLB: A Tale of Two
Countries
(coauthored with Borağan Aruoba and Frank Schorfheide)
2.1 Introduction
Japan has experienced near-zero interest rates since 1995 and in the U.S.
the federal funds rate dropped below 20 basis points in December 2008 and has
stayed near zero in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Simultaneously, Japan
experienced a deflation of about 1% per year. Investors’ access to money, which
yields a zero nominal return, prevents interest rates from falling below zero and
thereby creates a zero lower bound (ZLB) for nominal interest rates. The ZLB is
of great concern to policy makers because if an economy is at the ZLB, the central
bank is unable to stimulate the economy or react to deflation using a conventional
monetary policy that reduces interest rates.
One prominent explanation for the prolonged spell of zero interest rates and
deflation in Japan since the late 1990s is that the economy moved toward an unde-
sirable or unintended steady state. Once the ZLB is explicitly included in a stan-
dard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
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an interest-rate feedback rule, there are typically two steady states. In the targeted-
inflation steady state inflation equals the value targeted by the central bank and
nominal interest rates are strictly positive. In the second steady state, the deflation
steady state, nominal interest rates are zero and inflation rates are negative. Ben-
habib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a) were the first to study equilibria in which
an economy transitions from the neighborhood of the targeted-inflation steady state
to the undesirable deflation steady state.
While ex post the U.S. did not experience an extended period of deflation, a
potential switch to a deflation regime that resembles the economic experience of
Japan was a real concern to U.S. policy makers. For instance, James Bullard, the
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, discussed the possibility of
various shocks, including actions or announcements by the Federal Reserve, leading
the U.S. economy to settle near the deflation steady state Bullard (2010):
During this recovery, the U.S. economy is susceptible to negative shocks
that may dampen inflation expectations. This could push the economy
into an unintended, low nominal interest rate steady state. Escape from
such an outcome is problematic. [...] The United States is closer to a
Japanese-style outcome today than at any time in recent history. [...]
Promising to remain at zero for a long time is a double-edged sword. The
policy is consistent with the idea that inflation and inflation expectations
should rise in response to the promise and that this will eventually lead
the economy back toward the targeted equilibrium. But the policy is
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also consistent with the idea that inflation and inflation expectations
will instead fall and that the economy will settle in the neighborhood of
the unintended steady state, as Japan has in recent years.
The key contribution of our paper is to provide a formal econometric analysis
of the likelihood that Japan and the U.S. shifted to a regime that can be described
by fluctuations around a deflation steady state in a standard New Keynesian DSGE
model. While many authors have suggested that Japan’s experience resembles the
outcomes predicted by the deflation steady state, to the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the first to provide a full-fledged econometric assessment of this hypothesis.
We construct a sunspot equilibrium for an estimated small-scale New Keynesian
DSGE model with an explicit ZLB constraint, in which a sunspot shock can move
the economy from a targeted-inflation regime to a deflation regime. While this
sunspot shock is formally exogenous in our model, we offer an informal interpretation
according to which agents coordinate their expectations and actions based on the
central bank’s statements about the stance of monetary policy. Our paper also makes
an important technical contribution: it is the first paper to use global projection
methods to compute a sunspot equilibrium for a DSGE model with a full set of
stochastic shocks that can be used to track macroeconomic time series.
We estimate our model based on U.S. and Japanese data on output growth,
inflation, and interest rates, using observations that pre-date the episodes of zero
nominal interest rates. Conditioning on these parameter estimates, we use a non-
linear filter to extract the sequence of shocks that can explain the data. Most im-
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portantly, we obtain estimates of the probability that the economies were in either
the targeted-inflation or the deflation regime. We find that the U.S. and Japanese
ZLB experiences were markedly different: Japan shifted from the targeted-inflation
regime into the deflation regime in the second quarter of 1999. From an econometric
perspective, our sunspot model fits the Japanese data remarkably well. Despite the
simplicity of our DSGE model’s structure the filtered shock innovations are by and
large consistent with the probabilistic assumptions of independence and normality
underlying the model specification. The U.S. on the other hand, remained in the
targeted-inflation regime throughout our sample period. It experienced a sequence
of bad shocks during the Great Recession that pushed interest rates toward zero,
followed by an expansionary monetary policy that has kept interest rates at zero
since then. The large shocks necessary to capture the Great Recession are highly
unlikely under the probabilistic structure of the model, which is a common problem
for DSGE models with Gaussian innovations.
To illustrate the consequences of being in either regime, we conduct a sequence
of expansionary fiscal policy experiments, conditioning on states that are associated
with the ZLB episodes in the U.S. and Japan, and compare the outcomes of these
policies in the two countries. The two regimes have drastically different implications
for macroeconomic policies. Fiscal multipliers are about 20% smaller in the defla-
tionary regime, despite the economy remaining at the ZLB. While a commitment
by the central bank to keep rates near the ZLB doubles the fiscal multipliers in the
targeted-inflation regime (U.S.), it has no effect in the deflation regime (Japan).
Our paper is related to four strands of the literature: sunspots and multiplicity
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of equilibria in New Keynesian DSGE models; global projection methods for the
solution of DSGE models; the use of particle filters to extract hidden states based
on nonlinear state-space models; and the size of government spending multipliers at
the ZLB.
The relevance of sunspots in economic models was first discussed in Cass and
Shell (1983), who define sunspots as “extrinsic uncertainty, that is, random phe-
nomena that do not affect tastes, endowments, or production possibilities.” Sunspot
shocks can affect economic outcomes in environments in which there does not exist
a unique equilibrium. Multiplicity of equilibria in New Keynesian DSGE models
arises for two reasons. First, a passive monetary policy – meaning that in response
to a one percent deviation of inflation from its target the central bank raises nomi-
nal interest rates by less than one percent – can generate local indeterminacy in the
neighborhood of a steady state. An econometric analysis of this type of multiplicity
is provided by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). Second, the kink in the monetary
policy rule induced by the ZLB generates a second steady-state in which nominal
interest rates are zero and inflation rates are negative. Because in the neighborhood
of this second steady state the central bank is unable to lower interest rates in re-
sponse to a drop in inflation, the local dynamics are indeterminate. As a result it is
generally possible to construct a large number of equilibria in New Keynesian DSGE
models. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a,b) were the first to construct
equilibria in which the economy transitions from the targeted-inflation steady state
toward the deflation steady state. More recently, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012)
study an equilibrium in which confidence shocks combined with downward nominal
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wage rigidity can deliver jobless recoveries near the ZLB in a mostly analytical anal-
ysis. Cochrane (2013) abstracts from the existence of the deflationary steady state
and constructs multiple liquidity trap equilibria by assuming that after exiting the
ZLB monetary policy remains passive and exploiting the resulting local indetermi-
nacy. Armenter (2014) considers the multiplicity of Markov equilibria in a model in
which monetary policy is not represented by a Taylor rule but it is optimally chosen
to maximize social welfare.
Our paper focuses on an equilibrium in which a Markov-switching sunspot
shock moves the economy from the vicinity of one steady state to the vicinity of
the other steady state. This equilibrium allows us to provide a formal econometric
assessment of whether Japan or the U.S. have shifted toward the deflation steady
state during their respective ZLB episodes. Such a sunspot equilibrium has been
recently analyzed by Mertens and Ravn (2014), but in a model with a much more
restrictive exogenous shock structure. Our paper is the first to compute a sunspot
equilibrium in a New Keynesian DSGE model that is rich enough to track macroe-
conomic time series and to use a filter to extract the evolution of the hidden sunspot
shock.
In terms of solution method, our work is most closely related to the papers
by Judd, Maliar and Maliar (2010), Maliar and Maliar (2014), Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2012a), and Gust, Lopez-Salido and Smith (2012a).1 All of these papers use
1Most of the other papers that study DSGE models with a ZLB constraint take various short-
cuts to solve the model. In particular, following Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a), many authors
assume that an exogenous Markov-switching process pushes the economy to the ZLB. The sub-
sequent exit from the ZLB is exogenous and occurs with a prespecified probability. The absence
of other shocks makes it impossible to use the model to track actual data. Unfortunately, model
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global projection methods to approximate agents’ decision rules in a New Keynesian
DSGE model with a ZLB constraint. However, these papers solely consider an equi-
librium in which the economy is always in the targeted-inflation regime – what we
could call a targeted-inflation equilibrium – and some details of the implementation
of the solution algorithm are different.
To improve the accuracy of the model solution, we introduce two novel fea-
tures. First, we use a piece-wise smooth approximation with two separate functions
characterizing the decisions when the ZLB is binding and when it is not. This means
all our decision rules allow for kinks at points in the state space where the ZLB be-
comes binding. Second, when constructing a grid of points in the models’ state
space for which the equilibrium conditions are explicitly evaluated by the projec-
tion approach, we combine draws from the ergodic distribution of the DSGE model
with values of the state variables obtained by applying our filtering procedure. Our
modification of the ergodic-set method proposed by Judd, Maliar and Maliar (2010)
ensures that the model solution is accurate in a region of the state space that is
unlikely ex ante under the ergodic distribution of the model, but very important ex
post to explain the observed data. This modification turns out to be very important
when solving a model tailored to fit U.S. data.
With respect to the empirical analysis, the only other paper that combines a
projection solution with a nonlinear filter to track U.S. data throughout the Great
Recession period to extract estimates of the fundamental shocks is Gust, Lopez-
properties tend to be very sensitive to the approximation technique and to implicit or explicit
assumptions about the probability of leaving the ZLB, see Braun, Körber and Waki (2012) and
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012a).
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Salido and Smith (2012a). However, their empirical analysis is restricted to the
targeted-inflation equilibrium and focuses on the extent to which the ZLB con-
strained the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy. Moreover, ours is
the first paper to use a nonlinear DSGE model with an explicit ZLB constraint to
study the ZLB experience of Japan.
The effect of an increase in government spending when the economy is at the
ZLB has been studied by Braun, Körber and Waki (2012), Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo (2011b), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012a), Eggertsson (2009a), and
Mertens and Ravn (2014). Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011b) argue that
the fiscal multiplier at the ZLB can be substantially larger than one. In general, the
government spending multiplier crucially depends on whether the expansionary fiscal
policy triggers an exit from the ZLB. The longer the exit from the ZLB is delayed, the
larger the government spending multiplier. Mertens and Ravn (2014) emphasize that
in what we would call a deflation equilibrium, the effects of expansionary government
spending can be substantially smaller from the effects in the standard targeted-
inflation equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a
simple two-equation model that we use to illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria in
monetary models with ZLB constraints. We also highlight the types of equilibria
studied in this paper. The New Keynesian model that is used for the quantitative
analysis is presented in Section 2.3, and the solution of the model is discussed in
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 contains the quantitative analysis, and Section 2.6 concludes.
Detailed derivations, descriptions of algorithms, and additional quantitative results
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are summarized in an Online Appendix.
2.2 A Two-Equation Example
We begin with a simple two-equation example to characterize the sunspot
equilibrium that we will study in the remainder of this paper in the context of a
New Keynesian DSGE model with interest-rate feedback rule and ZLB constraint.
The example is adapted from Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a) and
Hursey and Wolman (2010). Suppose that the economy can be described by the
Fisher relationship
Rt = rEt[πt+1] (2.1)










, εt ∼ iidN(0, 1), ψ > 1. (2.2)
Here Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate, πt is the gross inflation rate, and
εt is a monetary policy shock. The gross nominal interest rate is bounded from
below by one. Throughout this paper we refer to this bound as the ZLB because it
bounds the net interest rate from below by zero. Combining (2.1) and (2.2) yields














This model has two steady states (σ = 0), which we call the targeted-inflation steady
state and the deflation steady state, respectively. In the targeted-inflation steady
state, inflation equals π∗, and the nominal interest rate is R = rπ∗. In the deflation
steady state, inflation equals πD = 1/r, and the nominal interest is RD = 1.
The presence of two steady states suggests that the nonlinear rational expec-
tation difference equation (2.3) has multiple stable stochastic solutions. We find
solutions to this equation using a guess-and-verify approach. A solution that fluc-
tuates around the targeted-inflation steady state is given by
π
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We can also obtain a solution that fluctuates around the deflation steady state:
π
(D)
















This second solution differs from (2.4) only with respect to the constant γD, and
has the same dynamics. We refer to π
(∗)
t as the targeted-inflation equilibrium and
π
(D)
t as the deflation equilibrium associated with (2.3).
2
In the remainder of the paper we will focus on an equilibrium in which a
two-state Markov-switching sunspot shock st ∈ {0, 1} triggers movements from a
2There can be other equilibria similar to (2.5) where the economy spends time around the
deflation steady state. Some of these can be simply constructed using (2.5) by changing the
dynamics in the region where the ZLB binds. See Appendix B.1 for an example.
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Figure 2.1: Inflation Dynamics in the Two-Equation Model
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Notes: In the top panel, the blue line shows the targeted-inflation equilibrium, and the red line
shows the deflation equilibrium. In the bottom panel, the shaded area corresponds to periods in
which the system is in the deflation regime.
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targeted-inflation regime to a deflation regime and vice versa:
π
(s)







The constants γ(1) and γ(0) are similar in magnitude (but not identical) to γ∗ and
γD in (2.4) and (2.5), respectively. The precise values depend on the transition
probabilities of the Markov switching process and ensure that (2.3) holds in every
period t. The fluctuations of π
(s)
t around π∗γ(st) are identical to the fluctuations
in the above targeted-inflation and deflation equilibria. Throughout this paper, we
will assume that the sunspot process evolves independently from the fundamental
shocks.3 A numerical illustration is provided in Figure 2.1. The top panel compares
the paths of net inflation under the targeted-inflation equilibrium (2.4) and the
deflation equilibrium (2.5). The difference between the inflation paths is the level
shift due to the constants γ∗ versus γD. The bottom panel shows the sunspot
equilibrium with visible shifts from the targeted-inflation regime to the deflation
regime (shaded areas) and back.
There exist many other solutions to (2.3). The local dynamics around the
deflation steady state, ignoring the ZLB constraint, are indeterminate, and it is pos-
sible to find alternative deflation equilibria. For example, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2001a) studies alternative equilibria in which the economy transitions
from the targeted-inflation regime to a deflation regime and remains in the deflation
3For the simple example in this section we can easily construct equilibria in which the Markov
transition is triggered by εt.
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regime permanently in continuous-time perfect foresight monetary models. Such
equilibria can also be constructed in our model, and one of them is discussed in
more detail in Appendix B.1.
2.3 A Prototypical New Keynesian DSGE Model
Our quantitative analysis will be based on a small-scale New Keynesian DSGE
model. Variants of this model have been widely studied in the literature and its prop-
erties are discussed in detail in Woodford (2003). The model economy consists of
perfectly competitive final-goods-producing firms, a continuum of monopolistically
competitive intermediate goods producers, a continuum of identical households, and
a government that engages in active monetary and passive fiscal policy. To keep the
dimension of the state space manageable, we abstract from capital accumulation
and wage rigidities. We describe the preferences and technologies of the agents in
Section 2.3.1, and summarize the equilibrium conditions in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.1 Preferences and Technologies
Households. Households derive utility from consumption Ct relative to an exoge-
nous habit stock and disutility from hours worked Ht. We assume that the habit
stock is given by the level of technology At, which ensures that the economy evolves
along a balanced growth path. We also assume that the households value transac-
tion services from real money balances, detrended by At, and include them in the
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subject to budget constraint
PtCt + Tt +Mt +Bt = PtWtHt +Mt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 + PtDt + PtSCt. (2.8)
Here β is the discount factor, 1/τ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
η is the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and Pt is the price of the final good. The
households supply labor services to the firms, taking the real wage Wt as given. At
the end of period t, households hold money in the amount of Mt. They have access
to a bond market where nominal government bonds Bt that pay gross interest Rt are
traded. Furthermore, the households receive profits Dt from the firms and pay lump-
sum taxes Tt. SCt is the net cash inflow from trading a full set of state-contingent
securities.
Detrended real money balances Mt/(PtAt) enter the utility function in an ad-
ditively separable fashion. An empirical justification of this assumption is provided
by Ireland (2004). As a consequence, the equilibrium has a block diagonal structure
under the interest-rate feedback rule that we will specify below: the level of output,
inflation, and interest rates can be determined independently of the money stock.
We assume that the marginal utility V ′(m) is decreasing in real money balances m
and reaches zero for m = m̄, which is the amount of money held in steady state
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by households if the net nominal interest rate is zero. Since the return on holding
money is zero, it provides the rationale for the ZLB on nominal rates. The usual
transversality condition on asset accumulation applies.
Firms. The final-goods producers aggregate intermediate goods, indexed by j ∈









The firms take input prices Pt(j) and output prices Pt as given. Profit maximization







Under the assumption of free entry into the final-goods market, profits are zero in










We define inflation as πt = Pt/Pt−1.
Intermediate good j is produced by a monopolist who has access to the fol-
lowing production technology:
Yt(j) = AtHt(j), (2.12)
83
where At is an exogenous productivity process that is common to all firms and Ht(j)
is the firm-specific labor input. Labor is hired in a perfectly competitive factor
market at the real wage Wt. Intermediate-goods-producing firms face quadratic










where φ governs the price stickiness in the economy and π̄ is a baseline rate of
price change that does not require the payment of any adjustment costs. In our
quantitative analysis, we set π̄ = 1, that is, it is costless to keep prices constant.
Firm j chooses its labor input Ht(j) and the price Pt(j) to maximize the present












Here, Qt+s|t is the time t value to the household of a unit of the consumption good
in period t+ s, which is treated as exogenous by the firm.
Government Policies. Monetary policy is described by an interest rate feedback














Here r is the steady-state real interest rate, π∗ is the target-inflation rate, and εR,t
is a monetary policy shock. The key departure from much of the New Keynesian
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DSGE literature is the use of the max operator to enforce the ZLB. Provided that
the ZLB is not binding, the central bank reacts to deviations of inflation from the
target rate π∗ and deviations of output growth from its long-run value γ.
The government consumes a stochastic fraction of aggregate output and gov-







The government levies a lump-sum tax Tt (or provides a subsidy if Tt is negative) to
finance any shortfalls in government revenues (or to rebate any surplus). Its budget
constraint is given by
PtGt +Mt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 = Tt +Mt +Bt. (2.17)
Exogenous shocks. The model economy is perturbed by three (fundamental)
exogenous processes. Aggregate productivity evolves according to
lnAt = ln γ + lnAt−1 + ln zt, where ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + σzεz,t. (2.18)
Thus, on average, the economy grows at the rate γ, and zt generates exogenous fluc-
tuations of the technology growth rate. We assume that the government spending
shock follows the AR(1) law of motion
ln gt = (1− ρg) ln g∗ + ρg ln gt−1 + σgεg,t. (2.19)
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While we formally introduce the exogenous process gt as a government spending
shock, we interpret it more broadly as an exogenous demand shock that contributes
to fluctuations in output. The monetary policy shock εR,t is assumed to be serially
uncorrelated. We stack the three innovations into the vector εt = [εz,t, εg,t, εr,t]
′
and assume that εt ∼ iidN(0, I).4 In addition to the fundamental shock processes,
agents in the model economy observe an exogenous sunspot shock st, which follows
a two-state Markov-switching process
P{st = 1} =

(1− p00) if st−1 = 0
p11 if st−1 = 1
. (2.20)
2.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
Since the exogenous productivity process has a stochastic trend, it is conve-
nient to characterize the equilibrium conditions of the model economy in terms of



























4Unlike some of the other papers in the ZLB literature, e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo
(2011b) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012a), we do not include a discount factor shock in the
model. We follow the strand of the literature that has estimated three-equation DSGE models
that are driven by a technology shock, a demand (government spending), and a monetary policy
shock and has documented that such models fit U.S. data for output growth, inflation, and interest
rates reasonably well before the Great Recession.
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which will be useful in the computational algorithm. A detailed derivation of the
equilibrium conditions is provided in Appendix B.2. The consumption Euler equa-
tion is given by
c−τt = βRtEt. (2.23)
In a symmetric equilibrium, in which all firms set the same price Pt(j), the price-
setting decision of the firms leads to the condition















This constant reflects both government spending as well as the resource cost (in
















We do not use a measure of money in our empirical analysis and therefore drop the
equilibrium condition that determines money demand.
As in the two-equation model in Section 2.2, the New Keynesian model with
the ZLB constraint has two steady states, which we refer to as the targeted-inflation
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and the deflation steady state. In the targeted-inflation steady state, inflation equals
π∗ and the gross interest rate equals rπ∗, while in the deflation steady state, inflation
equals 1/r and the interest rate equals one.
2.4 Solution Algorithm
We now discuss some key features of the algorithm that is used to solve the
nonlinear DSGE model presented in the previous section. Additional details can be
found in Appendix B.4.1. We utilize a global approximation following Judd (1992)
where the decision rules are assumed to be combinations of Chebyshev polynomials.
The minimum set of state variables associated with our DSGE model is
St = (Rt−1, yt−1, gt, zt, εR,t, st). (2.27)
An (approximate) solution of the DSGE model is a set of decision rules πt =
π(St; Θ), Et = E(St; Θ), ct = c(St; Θ), yt = y(St; Θ), and Rt = R(St; Θ) that
solve the nonlinear rational expectations system (2.21), (2.23), (2.24), (2.25), and
(2.26), where Θ ≡ {Θi} for i = 1, ..., N parameterize the decision rules. Note that
conditional on π(St; Θ) and E(St; Θ), equations (2.23), (2.25) and (2.26) determine
c(St; Θ), y(St; Θ), and R(St; Θ), and therefore these equations hold exactly.
The solution algorithm amounts to specifying a grid of points G = {S1, . . . ,SM}
in the model’s state space and solving for Θ such that the sum of squared resid-
uals associated with (2.21) and (2.24) are minimized for St ∈ G. There are three
non-standard aspects of our solution method that we will now discuss in more de-
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tail: first, the piecewise smooth representation of the functions π(·; Θ) and E(·; Θ);
second, our iterative procedure of choosing grid points G; and third, our method of
initializing Θ when constructing the decision rules for the sunspot equilibrium.
Piece-wise Smooth Decision Rules. We show in Appendix B.3 that the solution
to a simplified linearized version of our DSGE model entails piece-wise linear decision
rules. While Chebyshev polynomials, which are smooth functions of the states,
can in principle approximate functions with a kink, such approximations are quite
inaccurate for low-order polynomials. Thus, unlike Judd, Maliar and Maliar (2010),
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012a) and Gust, Lopez-Salido and Smith (2012a),




f 1π(St; Θ) if st = 1 and R(St) > 1
f 2π(St; Θ) if st = 1 and R(St) = 1
f 3π(St; Θ) if st = 0 and R(St) > 1
f 4π(St; Θ) if st = 0 and R(St) = 1
(2.28)
and similarly for E(St,Θ), where the functions f ij are linear combinations of a com-
plete set of Chebyshev polynomials up to fourth order. Our method is flexible
enough to allow for a kink in all decision rules and not just Rt, which has a kink by
its construction.
In our experience, the flexibility of the piece-wise smooth approximation yields
more accurate decision rules, especially for inflation. Figure 2.2 shows a slice of the
decision rules where we set st = 1, Rt−1 = 1, yt−1 = y∗, z = 0, and εR,t = 0 and vary
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Note: This figure shows the decision rules assuming parameter values p11 = 1 and η = ∞ (linear
disutility of labor). The x-axis shows the state variable g, while the other state variables are fixed
at st = 1, Rt−1 = 1, yt−1 = y∗, z = 0, and εR,t = 0.
gt in a wide range. The solid blue decision rules are based on the piece-wise smooth
approximation in (2.28), whereas the dashed red decision rules are obtained using a
single set of Chebyshev polynomials, which impose smoothness on all decision rules
except for R(St,Θ). When approximated smoothly, the decision rules fail to capture
the kinks that are apparent in the piece-wise smooth approximation. For instance,
the decision rule for output illustrates that the (marginal) government-spending
multiplier is sensitive to the ZLB – it is noticeably larger in the area of the state space
where the ZLB binds – and the decision rule for inflation shows a very significant
change in slope, neither of which is captured by the smooth approximation.
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Choice of Grid Points. With regard to the choice of grid points, projection
methods that require the solution to be accurate on a fixed grid, e.g., a tensor
product grid, become exceedingly difficult to implement as the number of state
variables increases above three. While the Smolyak grid proposed by Krueger and
Kubler (2004a) can alleviate the curse of dimensionality to some extent, we build on
recent work by Judd, Maliar and Maliar (2010)5, with a significant modification: we
combine simulated grid points (obtained using a time-separated-grid algorithm) with
states obtained from the data using a nonlinear filter. While Japanese data between
1981 and 2013 can be comfortably explained by the ergodic distribution associated
with the sunspot solution of the DSGE model, U.S. data since 2008 are much more
difficult to reconcile with the DSGE model. For the U.S., one needs shocks that are
several standard deviations away from the center of the ergodic distribution to reach
the ZLB in 2009. Thus, it is crucial to combine draws from the ergodic distribution
with states that are extracted from data on output growth, inflation, and interest
rates to generate the grid G. This ensures that our approximation remains accurate
in the area of the state space that is relevant for the empirical analysis. This is an
iterative process. For a given solution given by Θ, we simulate the model and get
a set of points that characterize the ergodic distribution. Then we run a particle
filter, details of which are provided in Section 2.5.4, to obtain the grid points which
5The work by Judd, Maliar, and Maliar evolved considerably over time. We initially built on
the working paper version, Judd, Maliar and Maliar (2010), which proposed to simulate the model
to be solved, to distinguish clusters on the simulated series, and to use the clusters’ centers as a
grid for projections. In the published version of the paper, Maliar and Maliar (2014) also consider
ε-distinguishable (EDS) grids and locally-adaptive EDS grids. Their locally-adaptive grids are
similar in spirit to our approach, which tries to control accuracy in a region of the state space that
is important for the substantive analysis, even if it is far in the tails of the ergodic distribution.
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are consistent with the U.S. data since 2008.
Initialization of Θ. Recall that the sunspot equilibrium decision rules are obtained
by solving for Θ that minimizes the sum of squared residuals associated with (2.21)
and (2.24) for St ∈ G. We start the solution process by solving the model assuming
p11 = p00 = 1, that is, both sunspot regimes are absorbing states. This means,
essentially, the decision rules evaluated at st = 1 (st = 0) resemble those that would
be obtained in the targeted-inflation equilibrium (a minimal-state-variable deflation
equilibrium). Once these decision rules are accurately obtained, after some iterations
of the simulate-filter-solve algorithm, we use them as initial guesses of the decision
rules of the full model with p11 < 1 and p00 < 1. When the transition probabilities
are nonzero, the agents anticipate regime changes to occur in the future and this
changes their decision rules. Still the initial guesses prove to be reasonably accurate.6
We parameterize each f ij for i = 1, ..., 4 and j = π, E with 126 parameters for a
total of 1,008 elements in Θ and use M = 624 including the grid points from the
ergodic distribution and the filtered states. For a given set of filtered states and
simulated grid, the solution takes about two minutes on a single-core Windows-
based computer using MATLAB. The approximation errors are on the order of 10−4
or smaller, expressed in consumption units.
6We do the filtering iteration three times and within each iteration we do the simulation-solve
iteration five times. Further iterations do not change the results in any appreciable way.
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2.5 Quantitative Analysis
The data sets used in the empirical analysis are described in Section 2.5.1. In
Section 2.5.2, we estimate the parameters of the DSGE model for the U.S. and Japan
using data from before the economies reached the ZLB. These parameter estimates
are the starting point for the subsequent analysis. In Section 2.5.3, we compare the
ergodic distributions of interest rates and inflation under the parameter estimates
obtained for the two countries. In Section 2.5.4 we show that the Japanese economy
shifted to the deflation regime at the end of the 1990s, which triggered a long spell
of zero nominal interest rates. The U.S., on the other hand, stayed in the targeted-
inflation regime after 2009 when interest rates reached the ZLB. Adverse demand
shocks contributed to the low interest rates initially, and subsequently an expan-
sionary monetary policy kept interest rates at zero. We offer an interpretation of
the evolution of the estimated sunspot shocks in Section 2.5.5. Finally, Section 2.5.6
compares the effects of an expansionary fiscal policy in the U.S. and Japan.
2.5.1 Data
The subsequent empirical analysis is based on real per-capita GDP growth,
GDP deflator inflation, and interest rate data for the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. inter-
est rate is the federal funds rate and for Japan we use the Bank of Japan’s uncollat-
eralized call rate. Further details about the data are provided in Appendix B.5. The
time series are plotted in Figure 2.3. The U.S. sample starts in 1984:Q1, after the
start of the Great Moderation, whereas the time series for Japan start in 1981:Q1.
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The vertical lines denote the end of the estimation sample, which is 2007:Q4 for
the U.S. and 1994:Q4 for Japan. We chose the endpoints for the estimation sample
such that the economies are unambiguously in the targeted-inflation regime and
away from the ZLB during the estimation period. For the U.S. the fourth quar-
ter of 2007 marks the beginning of the Great Recession, which was followed by a
long-lasting spell of zero interest rates starting in 2009. In Japan, short-term in-
terest rates dropped below 50 basis points in 1995:Q4 and have stayed at or near
zero ever since. A key feature of the deflation regime in our model is that infla-
tion rates are negative. While the U.S. experienced only two quarters of negative
inflation (2009:Q2 and Q3) and two quarters of inflation around 0.5% (2011:Q4 and
2013:Q2), inflation in Japan has been negative (or near zero) for most quarters since
1995. These features of the data are important for the identification of the sunspot
regimes.
2.5.2 Model Estimation
We verified that the decision rules for the targeted-inflation regime, in the
region of the state space for which the ZLB is far from being binding, are well ap-
proximated by the decision rules obtained from a second-order perturbation solution
of the DSGE model that ignores the ZLB. Because the perturbation solution is much
easier to compute and numerically more stable than the global approximation to the
sunspot equilibrium discussed in Section 2.4, we end the estimation samples for the
U.S. and Japan in 2007:Q4 and 1994:Q4, respectively. To obtain posterior esti-
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Figure 2.3: DataU.S. 1984-2013 Japan 1981-2013
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Note: See Section 2.5.1 for the data definitions. The vertical red line in each figure show the end of
the estimation sample. The yellow shading is explained in Section 2.5.4 and it shows the periods
during which P[{st = 1}|Y1:t] < 0.1 as assessed by the nonlinear filter.
mates of the DSGE model parameters we use a particle Markov chain Monte Carlo
approach along the lines of Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı́rez (2007) and
Andrieu, Doucet and Holenstein (2010), which approximates the likelihood function
with a particle filter and embeds that approximation into a Metropolis-Hastings
sampler.
The parameter estimates are in Table 2.1.7 A subset of the parameters were
fixed prior to estimation. We choose values for γ, β, and π∗ such that the steady state
of the model matches the average output growth, inflation, and interest rates over
7The prior distribution as well as the implementation of the posterior sampler are described in
Appendix B.6.
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Table 2.1: DSGE Model Parameters
Parameter Description U.S. Japan
τ Inverse IES 2.23 1.14
(1.85, 2.66) (0.72, 1.70)
κ Slope (linearized) Phillips curve 0.26 0.55
(0.16, 0.39) (0.36, 0.77)
ψ1 Taylor rule: weight on inflation 1.52 1.49
(1.45, 1.60) (1.41, 1.58)
ρR Interest rate smoothing 0.59 0.6
(0.51, 0.68) (0.47, 0.71)
ρg Persistence: demand shock 0.92 0.88
(0.88, 0.94) (0.82, 0.94)
ρz Persistence: technology shock 0.16 0.04
(0.05, 0.30) (0.01, 0.09)
100σR Std dev: monetary policy shock 0.23 0.23
(0.18, 0.30) (0.17, 0.30)
100σg Std dev: demand shock 0.54 1.02
(0.41, 0.70) (0.71, 1.51)
100σz Std dev: technology shock 0.54 1.02
(0.44, 0.66) (0.82, 1.26)
The Following Parameters Were Fixed During Estimation
100 ln γ Quarterly growth rate of technology 0.48 0.56
400(1/β − 1) Annualized discount rate 0.87 1.88
400 lnπ∗ Annualized inflation rate 2.52 1.28
(G/Y )∗ SS consumption/output ratio 0.15 0.16
η Frisch elasticity 0.85 0.72
ψ2 Taylor rule: weight on output growth 0.80 0.30
ν EOS intermediate inputs 0.10 0.10
p00 Prob of staying in deflation regime 0.95 0.95
p11 Prob of staying in targeted-inflation regime 0.99 0.99
Notes: We report posterior means and 90% credible intervals (5th and 95th percentile of the
posterior distribution) in parentheses. EOS is elasticity of substitution; SS is steady state. Note
that g∗ = 1/(1− (G/Y )∗). For the U.S. the estimation sample covers 1984:Q1-2007:Q4. For Japan
the estimation sample is 1981:Q1-1994:Q4.
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the estimation sample period.8 The steady state government expenditure-to-output
ratio is determined from national accounts data. Since our sample does not include
observations on labor market variables, we fix the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
Based on Rı́os-Rull et al. (2012a), who provide a detailed discussion of parameter
values that are appropriate for DSGE models of U.S. data, we set η = 0.85 for the
U.S. Our value for Japan is based on Kuroda and Yamamoto (2008), who use micro-
level data to estimate labor supply elasticities along the intensive and extensive for
males and females. The authors report a range of values which we aggregated into
η = 0.72.
We fix the value of ψ2 based on estimates of linearized DSGE models with an
output-growth rule.9 The parameter ν, which captures the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods, is set to 0.1. It is essentially not separately identifiable
from the price adjustment cost parameter φ. Finally, we need to specify values for
the transition probabilities p00 and p11. These parameters determine the expected
durations of staying in each regime. Since there is no clear empirical observation to
identify the transition probabilities, we informally chose p00 = 0.95 and p11 = 0.99.
These values make the deflation regime (st = 0) less persistent than the targeted-
inflation regime (st = 1) and imply unconditional regime probabilities of 0.17 (st =
0) and 0.83 (st = 1), respectively.
8In a nonlinear model, the average of the ergodic distribution is generally different from the
steady state. However, over the estimation period, the nonlinearities are not very strong and the
discrepancy is small.
9For Japan we use the average of the estimates from Ichiue, Kurozumi and Sunakawa (2013)
and Fujiwara, Hirose and Shintani (2011), which are 0.50 and 0.17 respectively. For the US we use
the estimate of Aruoba and Schorfheide (2013).
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For the remaining parameters, we report posterior mean estimates and 90%
credible intervals in Table 2.1. Overall, the estimates reported in the table are in
line with the estimates reported elsewhere in the literature. Most notable are the
estimates of the degree of price rigidity. Rather than reporting estimates for the
adjustment cost parameter φ, we report estimates for the implied slope of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve in a linearized version of the DSGE model (without ZLB
constraint). This transformation takes the form κ = τ(1 − ν)/(νπ2∗φ). The slope
estimate is 0.26 for the U.S. and 0.55 for Japan, implying fairly flexible prices and
relatively small real effects of unanticipated interest rate changes.10
2.5.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
To understand how our model behaves at its ergodic distribution, we simulate
a long sequence of draws using the estimates for both countries. Figure 2.4 depicts
contour plots of the ergodic distributions of inflation and interest rates for the two
countries in columns and for the two regimes in rows. In the contour plots each line
represents one percentile with the outermost line showing the 99th percentile. In
each panel we show the data used to estimate the model using black stars and the
post-estimation data using green stars. There are a number of noteworthy results.
First, the ergodic distributions are centered near the respective steady state values,
with the mean inflation when s = 1 slightly below π∗ and mean inflation when s = 0
below 1/r. Second, focusing on the top row, the estimation data falls squarely inside
10A survey of DSGE model-based New Keynesian Phillips curve is provided in Schorfheide
(2008b). Our estimates fall within the range of the estimates obtained in the literature.
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29% of ZLB obs
outside 99th
percentile
Notes: In each panel we report the joint probability density function (kernel density estimate) of
the annualized net interest rate and inflation, represented by the contours. Black stars show the
data used in estimation. Green stars show the rest of the data.
the ergodic distributions for s = 1 with only a few observations with high interest
rates for the U.S. Third, the ZLB is not observed in the ergodic distribution for
s = 1 for either country, while about 85% of observations feature the ZLB when
s = 0 for both countries. This is not surprising since the estimation samples of
both countries cover a period of above-zero interest rates and low macroeconomic
volatility. Finally, deflation is very unlikely in the U.S. when s = 1, with only a
1.1% probability, while in Japan this probability is much higher at 22.9%. When
s = 0, on the other hand, inflation is never positive.
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To provide more details about the ergodic distribution, annualized output
growth is virtually identical across the two regimes for both countries. An important
difference between the two regimes is the correlation of (detrended) output and
inflation. When s = 1, this correlation is strongly positive – 0.83 for the U.S.
and 0.73 for Japan – which is naturally consistent with the data, albeit somewhat
stronger. When s = 0, on the other hand, the correlation becomes strongly negative,
around −0.95 for both countries. This result is linked to the findings of Eggertsson
(2009a) and Mertens and Ravn (2014), who show that positive demand shocks may
lead to a negative comovement of prices and output in the deflation regime. Since
the majority of fluctuations in our model is explained by the demand shock, this
delivers the negative correlation.11
To understand what drives the correlation between inflation and output in
the model it is useful to consider a special case with ψ2 = 0, ρR = 0 and τ = 1.
Combing the Euler equation (2.23) with the policy rule (2.15) and the aggregate



























The relation given by (2.29) can be interpreted as an Aggregate Demand curve
(AD), because it relates output demand and inflation in the (y − π) plane. When
the ZLB does not bind, the Taylor principle implies that the nominal interest rate
11We show impulse responses for the U.S. economy in Appendix B.7.
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responds more than one-to-one to changes in inflation, hence the AD schedule is
downward sloping. On the other hand, when the ZLB binds, the nominal interest
rate no longer responds to changes in inflation, thus an increase in inflation lowers
the real interest rate and stimulates consumption. The associated increase in output
implies that the AD schedule bends and becomes upward sloping. In addition to the
AD curve, Equation 2.24 defines an upward sloping schedule in the (y − π) plane
that has the interpretation of an Aggregate Supply (AS) curve. The equilibrium
values of output and inflation are obtained solving the system of equations given by
the AS and AD curves.
Figure 2.5 shows the effect of a fiscal expansion in both the deflationary and
targeted inflation regime when the economy is at the ZLB. As discussed above, in
both cases the AD schedule is upward slopping. A fiscal expansion shifts the AD
curve out because for any level of inflation higher government expenditure increases
the demand for the final good. In the st = 0 regime deflationary spells are more
frequent and persistent compared to the st = 1 regime, hence the real interest rate
is higher and consumption is lower along the the AD schedule. This implies that
the AD curve is flatter in the st = 0 regime.
Panel (a) shows that in the st = 0 regime an increase in government ex-
penditure has a deflationary effect, whereas in panel (b) expansionary fiscal policy
increases inflation in the st = 1 regime. Ultimately the final effect on output and
inflation depends on the response of the AS curve arising from wealth effects on
labor supply. Mertens and Ravn (2014) show that the deflationary effect limits the
output expansion from a rightward shift in the AS curve. Our quantitative findings
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(b) Target Inflation Regime (st = 1)
Notes: The dashed blue line corresponds to the AD schedule with higher government expenditure.
in Section 2.5.6 further illustrate this point for the particular case of Japan.
The focus of this paper is not normative, but it is worth mentioning that the
deflationary regime is not necessarily “bad” in terms of welfare. Average consump-
tion across the two regimes are identical and the volatility of consumption is 24%
higher in the deflationary regime. The distance between actual and desired inflation
(0%) is larger in the deflationary regime relative to the targeted-inflation regime,
which means the adjustment costs will be larger. These observations would imply a
lower welfare for the deflationary regime. However, the interest rate is much closer,
in fact most of the time exactly equal to zero (the Friedman rule) and thus the
welfare cost due to holding money is much smaller. We leave a full-blown normative
analysis along the lines of Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) to future work.
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2.5.4 Evidence For the Deflation Regime in the U.S. and Japan
The DSGE model has a nonlinear state-space representation of the form
dt = Ψ(xt) + νt
xt = Fst(xt−1, εt) (2.30)
P{st = 1} =

(1− p00) if st−1 = 0
p11 if st−1 = 1
Here dt is the 3× 1 vector of observables consisting of output growth, inflation, and
nominal interest rates and D1:t is the sequence {d1, . . . , dt}. The vector xt stacks
the continuous state variables, which are given by xt = [Rt, yt, yt−1, zt, gt, At]
′, and
st ∈ {0, 1} is the Markov-switching process. The first equation in (2.30) is the
measurement equation, where νt ∼ N(0,Σν) is a vector of measurement errors. The
second equation corresponds to the law of motion of the continuous state variables.
The vector εt ∼ N(0, I) stacks the innovations εz,t, εg,t, and εR,t. The functions F0(·)
and F1(·) are generated by the model solution procedure described in Section 2.4.
The third equation represents the law of motion of the Markov-switching process.
Conditioning on the posterior mean estimates obtained in Section 2.5.2, we now
use a sequential Monte Carlo filter (also known as the particle filter)12 to extract
estimates of the sunspot shock process st, and the latent state xt.
The main result is presented in Figure 2.6, which depicts the filtered prob-
12This filter is a more elaborate version of the filter that underlies the estimation in Section 2.5.2.
It is described in detail in Appendix B.8. A recent survey of sequential Monte Carlo methods is
provided by Creal (2012).
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Figure 2.6: Filtered Probability of Targeted-Inflation Regime
U.S. Japan
Prob (s=1)















Notes: The solid red vertical bar indicates the end of the estimation sample. The shaded area
indicates time periods for which the filtered probability for the targeted-inflation regime falls below
10%.
abilities P[st = 1|D1:t] of being in the targeted-inflation regime. According to our
estimates, the experience of the U.S. and Japan was markedly different. With the ex-
ception of 2011:Q4, when the probability of the deflation regime increased to about
70%, the U.S. has been in the targeted-inflation regime. In 2009:Q2, the proba-
bility of the deflation regime is small, but non-zero, vindicating Bullard’s (2010)
concern of a shift to the deflationary regime. Japan, on the other hand, experienced
a switch to the deflation regime in 1999:Q2, and, except for the period from 2008:Q4
to 2009:Q3, has stayed in the deflation regime.13 Recall from Figure 2.3 that the
U.S. interest rates have been essentially zero since 2009:Q1, whereas in Japan inter-
est rates have been below 50 basis points since 1995:Q4, and essentially zero since
1999:Q1. While in the case of the U.S. the ZLB spell is interpreted as evidence in
13A large decline in oil prices led to a decrease in the import deflator which in turn generated
a large jump in the GDP deflator to about 6% in 2008:Q4. If we remove this observation, then
the temporary switch to the targeted-inflation regime vanishes. If we use CPI instead of the GDP
deflator as our price measure, we find a long spell of the deflation regime from 2000 to 2008 as well
as a subsequent shorter spell.
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favor of the targeted-inflation regime, for Japan it is attributed toward a shift into
the deflation equilibrium. The key reason for this difference is the behavior of in-
flation. The U.S. experienced only three quarters of low or negative inflation rates,
whereas prices have been on average falling for many years in Japan. The ergodic
distributions depicted in Figure 2.4 highlight that the deflation regime not only im-
plies that interest rates are close to zero, it also implies that inflation is negative
with very high probability. Accordingly, it shows that none of the ZLB observations
fall inside 99% of the ergodic distribution for the targeted-inflation refime for either
country, while about 70% of ZLB observations for Japan are well inside the ergodic
distribution for the deflation regime.
In the absence of a switch to the deflation regime, the U.S. reaches the ZLB
in response to very large negative innovations (greater than 2 standard deviations)
to the latent demand shock process gt. Since the DSGE model has a fairly strong
mean reversion, a sequence of expansionary monetary policy shocks are necessary
to prevent the nominal interest rate from rising. In the absence of these monetary
policy shocks, U.S. nominal interest rates would have averaged 1.3% whereas average
inflation would have been 0.4% instead of 1.6% after 2009. In Japan, the switch to
the deflation regime pushed the economy toward the ZLB. While interest rates are
close to zero in the deflation regime, Figure 2.4 shows that inflation rates should
be less than -2.5% with very high probability. The average inflation rate between
1999 and 2008 is about -1.3%. The model rationalizes the relatively low observed
deflation with a sequence of demand shock innovations that is on average slightly
negative. Recall that in the deflation regime a negative εg,t tends to raise inflation.
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2.5.5 Interpretation of Results
From the perspective of our model both the U.S. and the Japanese economy
experienced a sequence of adverse demand shocks that led to a fall in interest rates.14
In the U.S. it was the financial crisis that unfolded during 2008 and peaked in the
fourth quarter. For Japan some of the obvious culprits are the burst of the housing
bubble (1992:Q1), the East-Asian / Korean crises (1997) and the Russian Financial
Crisis (1998Q3). Following these events, short-term interest rates have been zero
both in the U.S. and Japan. The key finding of our empirical analysis is that the two
countries stayed at the ZLB for very different reasons. Japan experienced a switch
of the sunspot variable st from the targeted-inflation regime to the deflation regime
in 1999:Q2. The Japanese economy essentially stayed in the deflation regime until
the end of our sample in 2013. For the U.S., on the other hand, there is no strong
evidence of a switch to the deflation regime. A change in the sunspot regime means
that the agents in the economy coordinated their expectations and actions based on
some extraneous information. While this information is not directly observed by us,
we will compare aspects of monetary policy in Japan and the U.S. that may have
contributed to agents’ expectation formation and, through the lens of our model,
determined whether a regime switch occurred.
Mechanically, st is an exogenous process in our model and agents’ decision rules
and expectations about the future are indexed by st. Since a switch in st triggers
changes in expectations, we can interpret the sunspot shock also as an exogenous
14The filtered εg,t shocks are plotted in Figure B-4 and Figure B-5 in the Appendix.
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Notes: Units are annualized percentages. Vertical lines show the quarter where interest rates fall
to the ZLB in each country.
shock to expectations. In Figure 2.7 we plot 10-year inflation expectations for Japan
and the U.S. starting five years prior to each country’s respective ZLB episode. For
Japan we use the Consensus Forecasts and for the U.S. we use the results from
Aruoba (2014), which are based on surveys. The vertical lines in the figure depict
the start of the ZLB episode of the two countries. For the U.S., long-run inflation
expectations simply do not move during or after the financial crisis and they show
small fluctuations around 2.3%. For Japan, the expectations are around 2.5% prior
to the burst of the housing price bubble and they gradually decline to 0.5% by
2003. Of course the realized quarterly or annual inflation is consistently negative
throughout this period as well. Thus, the evidence in Figure 2.7 is consistent with
the interpretation that Japan experienced a shock to inflation expectations whereas
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the U.S. did not.
Inflation expectations are closely tied to expectations about future monetary
policy. In Japan the policy rate was pushed to the ZLB in 1999, but any further
action such as committing to a particular target or quantitative easing (QE) was
expressly ruled out. A speech by the then-governor Hayami (1999) explains that
this policy is in effect “until deflationary concerns subside” (Page 1). He then goes
on to imply that rates may go up before inflation becomes positive, if the Bank of
Japan decides that price stability may be at jeopardy at some future point in time.
In fact, the Bank of Japan increased its policy rate in August 2000 based on inflation
concerns, even though prices had been continuously falling for many quarters. He
also dismisses the need for QE, arguing that a cut in the interest rate achieves what
QE can achieve, no more, no less. When QE was finally implemented in 2001,
the policy wasn’t explained clearly and previous claims by bank officials about the
perceived ineffectiveness of QE were not refuted. To sum up, as Ito and Mishkin
(2006), who provide and excellent (and critical) summary of the actions taken by
the Bank of Japan and the Japanese government, put it: “The Bank of Japan had a
credibility problem, particularly under the Hayami Regime [1998-2003], in which the
markets and the public did not expect the Bank of Japan to pursue expansionary
monetary policy in the future, which would ensure that deflation would end. These
mistakes in the management of expectations are a key reason why Japan found itself
in a deflation that it is finding very difficult to get out of” (Page 165).
The actions of U.S. policymakers following the financial crisis of 2008 contrast
greatly with the actions of the Bank of Japan. The Federal Reserve and in gen-
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eral policy makers in the U.S. reacted to the financial crisis very forcefully, using
unconventional tools early on. By the end of 2008 as the federal funds rate target
was brought to near-zero levels, several rounds of large-scale asset purchase policies
were implemented to provide liquidity to the banking system and lower long-term
interest rates. Moreover, the Federal Reserve implemented a policy of “forward
guidance.” Starting from the December 2008 policy announcement, the Federal Re-
serve made its intention of keeping the federal funds rate near zero for an extended
period of time very clear. The December 2008 press release includes the following
statement: “The committee anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely
to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time.” The
statement was strengthened by changing “some time” to “an extended period” three
months later. Starting in August 2011, the Federal Reserve was even more specific,
providing explicit time frames for the low rates.
Thus, a plausible interpretation of our empirical findings is the following. In
the U.S. the expansionary unconventional monetary policies of the Federal Reserve
kept inflation expectations anchored and prevented a switch to the deflation regime.
The Bank of Japan, on the other hand, did not convince the public that it would pur-
sue an aggressive expansionary monetary policy, which triggered an adverse shock
to inflation expectations and moved the economy into the deflation regime. Ueda
(2012) provides a very thorough review of the policies used in the U.S. and Japan
and he concludes that “the entrenched nature of deflationary expectations, however,
seems to have prevented [the zero interest rate and QE policies to increase infla-
tion expectations on a significant scale for a sustained period]. Unfortunately, the
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Japanese economy seems to be trapped in an ‘equilibrium’ whereby only exogenous
forces generate movements to a better equilibrium with a higher rate of inflation”
(Page 20). This, of course, is precisely the point we show formally in this paper.
2.5.6 Policy Experiments
During their respective ZLB episodes, both Japan and the U.S. engaged in
unprecedented fiscal and monetary interventions. The U.S. enacted the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009, which consisted of
various fiscal interventions, a significant part of which was government spending.
Similarly, there have been numerous fiscal programs in Japan starting in 1998, some
of which were explicitly aimed at dealing with various local shocks (e.g., the 2011
earthquake) or global shocks (e.g., the global financial crisis), and starting in 2010
with deflation. We provide a summary of these programs in Table B-1. All of these
policies were aimed at increasing real economic activity, increasing inflation from
deflationary levels (or preventing it from going there), or both. In this section, our
main goal is to demonstrate how these fiscal policies may have drastically different
effects on the economy, depending on whether a shift to the deflation regime or an
adverse sequence of shocks in the targeted-inflation regime is what is keeping the
economy near the ZLB.
The recent literature has emphasized that the effects of expansionary fiscal
policies on output may be larger if the economy is at or near the ZLB. In the
absence of the ZLB, a typical interest rate feedback rule implies that the central
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bank raises nominal interest rates in response to rising inflation and output caused
by an increase in government spending. This monetary contraction raises the real
interest rate, reduces private consumption, and overall dampens the stimulating
effect of the fiscal expansion. If the economy is at the ZLB, the expansionary fiscal
policy is less likely to be accompanied by a rise in interest rates because the feedback
portion of the policy rule tends to predict negative interest rates. Without a rising
nominal interest rate, the increase in inflation that results from the fiscal expansion
reduces the real rate. In turn, current-period demand is stimulated, amplifying the
positive effect on output. In fact, the decision rules depicted in Figure 2.2 show that
when the ZLB starts to bind, the response of output to an increase in government
spending is larger, and consumption goes up.15
2.5.6.1 Details of the Policy Experiments
Due to the nonlinearity of our DSGE model, the effect of policy interventions
captured by impulse response functions depends on the initial state of the economy.
Rather than conditioning on one particular time period, we average results for sev-
eral periods. We distinguish between ZLB periods (2009:Q1 to 2011:Q1 for the U.S.
and 1999:Q2 to 2005:Q2 for Japan) and non-ZLB periods (1984:Q1 to 2005:Q2 for
the U.S. and 1981:Q2 to 1991:Q2 for Japan).
15To be clear, the typical exercise in the literature is not a standard impulse response analysis.
The analysis assumes the existence of a very large impulse other than the policy impulse being
considered that affects the economy and causes the ZLB to bind. This shock is assumed to be
large enough so that even after the policy impulse, which would have increased the nominal interest
rate, the ZLB continues to bind. As an example, Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012a) uses an eight-
standard-deviation shock to the discount factor to keep the economy at the ZLB.
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The policy effect for a particular quarter is computed as follows. Suppose that
we condition on the state of the economy in period t− 1 and track the economy for
H periods. First we compute P[st+h = 1|D1:t+h], where D1:t+h denotes the sequence
of observations d1, . . . , dt+h for h = 0, 1, . . . , H. If this probability exceeds 10% we
set s̃t+h = 1; otherwise we set s̃t+h = 0. Second, we compute an estimate of the
remaining states: x̃t−1 = E[xt−1|s̃t, D1:t] as well as estimates of the shocks ε̃i,t+h =
E[εi,t+h|s̃t:t+h, D1:t+h] for i = g, r, z. Third, we compute the non-intervention path by
iterating the state-transition equations forward based on the filtered shocks ε̃i,t+h.
By construction, the non-intervention path reproduces the actual data. Fourth,
we generate the intervention paths for consumption, output, inflation and interest
rates (signified by an I superscript) by setting εIg,t = ε̃g,t + f (f represents the size
of the fiscal intervention), εIr,t = ε̃r,t, ε
I
z,t = ε̃z,t, and ε
I
i,t+h = ε̃i,t+h for i = g, r, z and
h > 0 and iterating the state-transition equation forward based on the εIi,t+h’s. We











Note that according to our timing convention H = 0 corresponds to the multiplier
upon impact of the shock.
After conducting the same policy intervention for every period t in the ZLB
(non-ZLB) period, we record the median and various percentiles of the government
spending multiplier and the difference between the paths with and without the
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intervention. For the ZLB period this methodology conditions on the economy
being at the ZLB, integrating out the conditions that cause the economy to stay at
the ZLB.
We consider two policy experiments, beginning with a pure fiscal expansion
where g increases by 1.5σg. This is a reasonably large intervention, which is also
in line with the actual policy interventions in these countries.16 The second exper-
iment couples the same fiscal intervention with a commitment by the central bank
to keep interest rates at or near the ZLB. This central bank intervention is imple-
mented using a sequence of unanticipated monetary policy shocks εR,t.
17 To avoid
implausibly large interventions, we choose these shocks such that they are no larger
than two standard deviations in absolute value, and the interest-rate intervention is
no larger than one percentage point in annualized terms in any quarter. Thus, we
implicitly assume that the central bank would renege on a policy to keep interest
rates near zero for an extended period of time in states of the world in which output
growth and/or inflation turn out to be high. For each experiment, we report the
paths of key variables following the policy interventions, as well as the cumulative
government spending multiplier. Appendix B.4.2 provides some more details.
16For example, when we looked at the funding for federal contracts, grants, and loans portion
of ARRA as disbursed in the first two quarters of the program, which amounts to just over 1% of
GDP, this is equivalent to a g shock of size 1.4σg. Table B-1 also shows that there were sizable
fiscal programs in Japan, some of which were upwards of 3% of GDP.
17A detailed discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of using unanticipated versus
anticipated monetary policy shocks to generate predictions conditional on an interest rate path is
provided in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2012b).
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2.5.6.2 Pure Fiscal Policy Intervention
The impulse responses for the fiscal-only policy intervention for the U.S. is
presented in Figure 2.8 and the multipliers for all policy experiments are summarized
in Table 2.2. In each panel of Figure 2.8 the blue line indicates the response of
the economy during non-ZLB periods and the red line shows the response of the
economy during the ZLB periods. Recall that in the U.S. the ZLB is reached within
the targeted-inflation regime by large adverse demand shocks. Even though these
shocks lie far in the tails of the ergodic distribution, the response of the economy
in the ZLB period closely resembles the response during non-ZLB periods, which in
turn is the “standard” response to a government spending shock in a New Keynesian
DSGE model: on impact output goes up by slightly less than 0.5% and inflation
increases by about 25 basis points. As a result, the central bank raises the nominal
interest rate by over 75 basis points, which means roughly a 50 basis point increase
in the real interest rate. This reduces consumption by over 0.35%, which is the
standard crowding-out effect of government spending. All of these changes yield a
fiscal multiplier of 0.62 on impact, which goes up to 0.70 at the end of three years.
In light of the results reported in the literature on government spending mul-
tipliers during ZLB episodes it may be surprising that our impulse responses during
non-ZLB and ZLB periods depicted in Figure 2.8 are so similar. The reason for the
similarity is that despite being at the ZLB prior to the impact of the shock, the econ-
omy leaves the ZLB as soon as the shock hits, because we do not keep the economy
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Figure 2.8: Fiscal-Only Intervention - U.S.
Interest Rate (%)




























Notes: The blue line shows the pointwise median response of the economy in “normal” times
and the red line shows the pointwise median response of the economy in the ZLB period. See
Section 2.5.6.1 for the definitions. The interest and inflation rates are annualized. The bottom
panels show the percentage change in the level of consumption and output.
Table 2.2: Cumulative Fiscal Multipliers
U.S. Japan
H 0 3 7 11 0 3 7 11
Ergodic Distribution
Fiscal 0.62 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.56
ZLB Episode
Fiscal 0.62 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46
Fiscal and Monetary 1.16 1.23 1.25 1.24 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46
Note: The multiplier is defined in (2.31).
at the ZLB through another concurrent shock.18 As soon as the economy exits the
18When Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012a) conduct a similar exercise without forcing the ZLB,
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ZLB, the additional channel that boosts the output response through the reduction
of the real interest rate is absent. A second reason for the relatively small multiplier
is the Frisch labor supply elasticity of η = 0.85. The multiplier is increasing in η
and almost reaches one if η =∞, i.e., preferences are quasi linear.19
For Japan a very different picture emerges. Results are presented in Figure 2.9.
As we discussed in Section 2.5.4, Japan remains at the deflationary regime (st = 0)
throughout the ZLB period and thus behaves very differently relative to the non-
ZLB period. In particular, as a result of the fiscal intervention, the inflation rate falls
sharply by 100 basis points in the ZLB period, while it increases, as the conventional
wisdom would suggest, during non-ZLB periods. This decline in inflation is large
enough to wipe out any desire for the central bank to increase the interest rate and
thus the economy stays at the ZLB. A constant interest rate along with a decline in
inflation increases the real interest rate and this depresses consumption further.
Note that this is the channel emphasized in the literature as being responsible
for increasing the multiplier at the ZLB but working in exactly the opposite direction
since inflation falls. At the end, output still goes up as a result of this intervention
but the increase is reduced by about 0.15%, which is almost a fifth of the response
during the non-ZLB periods. In terms of multipliers, the impact multiplier in normal
times is 0.58 and it is 0.47 in the ZLB period.
they get a multiplier around 0.5. See footnote 15 for further details.
19Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011b) obtain multipliers larger than one even away from
the ZLB by using a utility function where consumption and leisure are close complements so that
when employment increases in response to a government spending shock, so does consumption.
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Figure 2.9: Fiscal-Only Intervention - Japan
Interest Rate (%)































Notes: The blue line shows the pointwise median response of the economy in “normal” times and
the red line shows the pointwise median response of the economy in the ZLB period. The shaded
areas are the upper and lower 20% percentiles of the distribution of responses. See Section 2.5.6.1
for the definitions. The interest and inflation rates are annualized. The bottom panels show the
percentage change in the level of consumption and output.
2.5.6.3 Combined Fiscal and Monetary Policy Intervention
We now combine the fiscal intervention with the promise of the central bank
to keep rates at or near the ZLB. We only consider the ZLB period for this exercise
since in “normal” times the interest rate is far from the ZLB and an expansionary
monetary policy that pushes the interest rate all the way to zero would be unrealistic.
In Japan the interest rate remains zero after the fiscal-only intervention, thus we
consider the combined fiscal and monetary policy only for the U.S. The results are
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Figure 2.10: Combined Fiscal and Monetary Intervention at the ZLB - U.S.
Interest Rate (%)




























Notes: The purple line shows the pointwise median response of the economy to the fiscal-only
intervention (the red line in Figure 2.8) and the green line shows the pointwise median response
of the economy to the combined intervention. The shaded areas are the upper and lower 20%
percentiles of the distribution of responses. The interest and inflation rates are annualized. The
bottom panels show the percentage change in the level of consumption and output.
reported in Figure 2.10.
In all of the twelve quarters under consideration, the central bank manages to
pull the interest rate all the way to the ZLB, despite the increasing urge not to do
so due to higher inflation and output responses. As a result, the output response
exactly doubles to almost 1%, a large fraction of which comes from the smaller
decline in consumption, since the channel through the real interest rate is in effect.
The impact multiplier increases by 87% and after three years the multiplier is still
77% larger. All of this shows that, unlike Japan which is in the deflationary regime,
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when the economy is at the ZLB because of adverse demand shocks within the
targeted-inflation regime, the monetary stimulus we consider provides a very large
additional boost to the fiscal intervention. In this regard, our empirical findings are
consistent with earlier results reported in the literature. However, our interpretation
is different. The reason that the fiscal intervention has a large effect is because an
expansionary monetary policy keeps interest rates at zero. This interpretation is
consistent with the filtered monetary policy shocks shown in Appendix B.8.5. On
average, these shocks have been negative after 2009, meaning that from an ex-post
perspective, monetary policy, through the lens of our model, has been expansionary
in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
2.6 Conclusion
We solve a small-scale New Keynesian DSGE model with the ZLB constraint
and Markov sunspot shocks that can move the economy between a targeted-inflation
regime and a deflation regime. An economy may stay at or near the ZLB either by
successive exogenous shocks (e.g. adverse demand or technology shocks or expan-
sionary monetary policy shocks) in the former regime or by a regime switch to the
latter. We develop a framework that can distinguish these two possibilities and
apply it to the ZLB episode of the U.S. since 2008 and Japan since late 1990s. Ac-
cording to our estimation results, the U.S. and Japanese experiences were markedly
different. Adverse demand shocks have moved the U.S. economy to the ZLB in 2009
and, subsequently, an expansive monetary policy has kept interest rates close to
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zero. In contrast, the Japanese economy stayed at the ZLB by a switch to the defla-
tion regime in 1999. While both economies were affected by adverse demand shocks
that pushed them to the ZLB, we argue that the U.S. economy did not experience
a regime switch due to the strong and committed response of the Federal Reserve
that coordinated private inflation expectations near its target. The Bank of Japan,
on the other hand, was unable to coordinate expectations, perhaps due to its weak
reaction to the adverse shocks early on, and the regime switch took place.
The U.S. and Japan’s experiences of moving to the ZLB have drastically differ-
ent policy implications. Fiscal multipliers are about 20% smaller in the deflationary
regime, despite the economy remaining at the ZLB. While a commitment by the cen-
tral bank to keep rates near the ZLB doubles the fiscal multipliers in the targeted-
inflation regime (U.S.), it has no effect in the deflation regime (Japan). Moreover,
our results show that Japan experienced persistent deflation because of the switch to
the deflationary regime and this may explain why numerous fiscal policies enacted
in Japan in the last 15 years were not able generate positive inflation.
Solving for the sunspot equilibrium is computationally challenging. We leave
extensions to larger DSGE models and equilibria in which the regime shifts are trig-
gered by fundamental shocks to future research. The latter will be important in
formalizing the idea we explored in this paper where central bank’s actions other
than their interest rate decisions may help coordinate private expectations and in-
duce a switch in regimes. Finally, in future work we plan to conduct a normative
analysis in the sunspot equilibrium.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 DSGE model
A.1.1 Model description
The economy is composed by households, firms and the government. Next I
describe the optimization problem of each agent in the economy:














PtCt + PtIt +Bt ≤ WtLt +Rkt utK̄t−1 − PtA(ut)K̄t−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 − PtTt + Πt








Let Λt be the multiplier associated with the nominal budget constraint and Ξt the
multiplier associated with the law of motion of installed capital. The optimality
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And the associated Euler equation is:
Λt = βRtEtΛt+1



































The optimal level of capacity utilization satisfies the condition:
Rkt = PtA′(ut)




Intermediate-goods firms Firms operate a technology that combines labor and
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capital to produce the intermediate good. Taking the demand for their products as
given, intermediate-goods firms have to choose their demand for labor and capital
input and set the price at which they sell their product. The problem can be broken
in these two stages.
Optimal factor demand First firms takes the price of its output as given
and rent capital Ki,t and labor Hi,t from households to minimize costs subject to its
production technology. To hire labor firms pay the real wage Wt and a rental rate




s.t. Yi,t ≤ Kαi,t (AtHi,t)1−α − AtF
This problem yields the following first order conditions:













This implies that all firms choose the same demand for factors of production, and
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one can write an expression for marginal costs as:
MCt = α





















Pricing decision . Taking the marginal cost as given, In the second stage firms set
prices to maximize (nominal) profits: Dt = [1− Φp (Pi,t/Pit−1)]Pi,tYt(i)−MCtYt(i)















































+ . . .
To ease the notation I use θ = 1
λp














































Symmetric price equilibrium. In a symmetric equilibrium this reduces to:
Λt
{












In a symmetric equilibrium the optimal pricing decision yields the following equi-
librium condition:













Marginal costs. Before setting prices the firm decides the optimal factor demand
after minimizing production costs given by the term WtLi,t +R
k
tKi,t subject to the
production technology described earlier. Here I assume that labor and capital are
traded in an economy wide factor market which results in simple solution in which






consequence all intermediate firms face identical marginal costs given by:
MCt = α
−α(1− α)−(1−α)W 1−αt Rkαt A−(1−α)t .
A.1.2 Steady state




− 1 + δ
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From this point on it will be easier to characterize the steady state as a function of
the capital-labor ratio:








And then we ca replace in the expression for w to obtain,










From the production function we can obtain,
y
L
= (k/L)α − F
L
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And since F is set such that profits are zero in steady state and using the result
that Φp(π
∗) = 0, we have:
F
L





Now using the law of motion of effective capital and the definition of effective capital
we have:
i/k = γ − (1− δ)


















Now we need to solve for the steady state value of hours worked L in order to recover
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γ − b
























With the steady state level of hours we can directly recover the steady state of
k, c, i, y,F .
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A.2 Computing the Nonlinear Solution
I explain how to solve the nonlinear decision rules. I use the notation S =[
R−1, c−1, k̄−1, i−1, µ, d, z, g, ε
r
]
to summarize the state variables, and approximate
the decision rules C = {L(S), q(S), λ(S), i(S), π(S)}
A.2.1 Residuals
To find the policy functions that solves the above system of equilibrium con-
ditions I minimize the sum of squared residuals with respect to the unknown coeffi-
cients Θ. To that end, I first define the residual functions that will serve as metric
for the solution procedure described later.











γc′ez′ − hc (A.2)
R3(S) = q(S)− βE
λ(S′)
γez′λ(S)
{ρ(S′)u′ −A(u′) + (1− δ)q(S′)} (A.3)

























To evaluate the expectations that form part of the residual equations (A.1) -
(A.5), I use deterministic integration methods based on a Gauss-Hermite quadrature
rule. The exogenous components of the state vector, S′, is constructed using a non-
product using the sparse grid algorithm of Heiss and Winschel (2006). For example,
suppose that we want to compute E[f(x)] for x ∈ RD where, x is a vector of random
variables distributed according to N(0, ID).
Define first the Qth order discrete approximation to any univariate function
Eg(x) to be:




Where xi and wi are the Gauss-Hermite nodes and weights as in Judd (1998). Usu-
ally to evaluate Ef(x) one would construct a tensor product approximation using
the xi, and wi for each element in x. However this approach becomes computa-
tionally costly as the dimensionality of the function of interest and the accuracy of
the approximation Q increases. To simplify, take the case of a bivariate function
D = 2, and define the set of indexes ID=2Q =
{
i ∈ ND : ∑Dd=1 id = D +Q}, where N
is the set of all positive integers. The level-k sparse grid approximation with D = 2







k − 1− q
) D∑
i∈IQ
Vi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ViD
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A.2.3 Computational Algorithm
Algorithm 2 The solution algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Without loss of generality begin in step j with a guess for the unknown coeffi-
cients Θ(j).
2. Construct the approximated decision rules:
C(j) = {L(S; Θ(j)), q(S; Θ(j)), λ(S; Θ(j)), i(S; Θ(j)), π(S; Θ(j))}
3. Construct the following objects using the decision rules that correspond to a
non-binding ZLB (Θnb): w, ρ, u,mc, c, k̄, y, using equations (1.25) - (1.31).
4. Compute the notional interest rate using (1.32). If the the notional rate vi-
olates the ZLB go back to step 3, set R = 1 and recompute all objects using
Θb.
5. Repeat steps 1 - 4, to construct and evaluate the objects inside the expectations
in (A.1) - (A.5).
6. Updated the vector of unknown coefficients to Θ(j+1) using any minimization
routine until a solution for minΘ
∑M
i=1R(Si,Θ)2 is found.
A.2.4 Accuracy of the Nonlinear Solution
The accuracy of the numerical solution is evaluated with respect to the residual
functions defined in Section A.2.1. If one could obtain the actual policy functions
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instead of the approximated ones, then Equation A.1-Equation A.5 would be sat-
isfied exactly. A measure of the ”exactness” of the approximated policy rules can
be measured by how much does the approximated decision rules fail to satisfy the
residual equations exactly. To take an specific example, take Equation A.1:









The above expression measured in terms of consumption units is expressed in log 10
for ease of interpretation. Figure A.1 shows the distribution of the Euler Errors for
all the residual functions.
Figure A.1: Distribution of Euler Equation Errors in log 10 units
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A.2.5 Posterior Predictive Checks
An brief introduction to the use of predictive checks can be found in del Negro
and Schorfheide (2012a). The predictive checks rests upon the construction of the
predictive distribution of a sequence of simulated data p(ỸT |ΩT ) where ΩT is the
information set available up to period T and includes the realization of the observed
data YT and the draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters of the model
p(θ|ΩT ). 3 describes how to obtain draws from the predictive distribution. Once
these draws are obtained they can be transformed into empirical moments of interest
S(ỸT ) ∈ Rn, for example sample means, covariances, autocovariances, correlations,
etc. I compute the posterior predictive checks for the five observable series used
for estimation. The predictive distribution is constructed using T = 100 periods
initialized at the deterministic steady state of the model and sampling N = 1, 000
realizations of the posterior distribution of estimated parameters.
Algorithm 3 Drawing from p(ỸT |ΩT )
1. Fix a draw of the parameter vector from the posterior distribution, θj, j =
1, . . . , N .
2. Use the model solution to simulate a sequence of observables Ỹt(θj), t =
1, . . . , T .
3. Construct the vector of moments of interest S : ỸT (θj)→ S(ỸT ) ∈ Rn×1.
4. The posterior predictive distribution p(S(ỸT )|ΩT ) can be characterized with
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the empirical distribution of S(ỸT ).
5. Compare the distribution of S(ỸT ) with the corresponding statistic based on
actual data S(YT ).
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A.3 Data for Estimation and Filtering
All information comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED data
service (mnemonics in parenthesis), for the period 1984:Q1 to 2013:Q4
1. Price Level. Is the implicit GDP price deflator (GDPDEF) index.
2. Population. Is the civilian non-institutionalized population over sixteen years (CNP16OV).
3. Per Capita Output Growth Real per-capita output growth is constructed using data on














4. Per Capita Consumption Growth. Real per-capita consumption growth is constructed
first summing Personal Consumption Services (PCESV) + Personal Consumption Durables














5. Per Capita Investment Growth. Real per-capita investment growth is constructed first
summing Personal Consumption Durable Goods(PCEDG) + Fixed Private Investment(FPI)
+ Change in Private Inventories(CBI). Let INVt = PCEDGt + FPIt + CBIt, expressed















6. Inflation. The inflation rate is measured as the quarterly change of GDPDEF:
πt = [lnGDPDEFt − lnGDPDEFt−1]× 100
7. Interest Rate. The nominal interest rate is measured using the quarterly rate of the




Here I describe the algorithm used to approximate the filtering density p(st|Y t)
used to recover the unobserved states of the economy. The exposition follows Creal
(2009) and Andrieu, Doucet and Holenstein (2010). An in depth treatment with
applications to the New Keynesian models can be found in Herbst and Schorfheide
(2014).
To simplify the discussion I consider a single variable dynamic model, whose
dynamics can be represented in the form of a nonlinear state-space system:
st = g (st−1, ut) , ut ∼ N(0, σu) (A.4.1)
yt = m(st) + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σε) (A.4.2)
This systems gives rise to the measurement density p(yt|st) and the transition density
p(xt|xt−1), which inherit their Markov structure from the transition equation of the
model. Given a sequence of observations yt = {y1, . . . , yt} we are interested in
recovering the sequence of states that generated them xt = {x1, . . . , xt}. But because
the system is stochastic we can only characterize the joint distribution where the
states comes from, p(xt|yt), known as the joint filtering distribution.
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A.4.1 Filtering Distribution Decomposition.













The last steps follows from the Markov property of the transition and measurement
densities. This makes clear that it is possible to characterize the filtering density
sequentially starting from some initial joint density of states p(st−1|yt−1). The scal-
ing factor in the last equation is the marginal contribution of observation yt to the
likelihood.
A.4.2 Marginal Distribution Decomposition.
An alternative to trying to uncover the joint distributions of states, the filtering
problem can be cast in terms of the marginal distribution p(st|yt). This is the key
approach taken in the implementation of Sequential Monte Carlo methods. One
can thing of this decomposition as a form of sequential learning, yielding greater
flexibility to the filtering approach.
Suppose we have access to an initial distribution of states p(s0). Given the
evolution of the system to a known position, yt−1, st−1, the marginal predictive
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Given the additive nature of the measurement errors in the observation equation the
observation density: p(yt|st) can be readily evaluated. However, there is no closed
form expression for the objects that form the marginal predictive density p(st|yt−1)
or the marginal likelihood p(yt|yt−1)
A.4.3 Sequential Monte Carlo Approximation
The key challenge in uncovering the marginal distribution of unobserved states
is solving for the integrals that shown in the previous section. I will use Monte
Carlo methods to approximate these objects. The key idea, is to start with a
probability mass function represented by a collection of particles {π(j)t−1}Nj=1 with
associated weights {W (j)t−1}Nj=1 to approximate the filtering density p(st−1|yt−1) and
systematically use the model transition and measurement equations to update this
approximation to obtain p(st|yt).
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A.4.3.1 Importance Sampler.
If we could simply draw the particles and weights {π(j)t ,W jt }Nj=1 from the target
















Because this is not possible in practice because the target distribution is unknown,
the approximation has to be constructed in a different way. The solution is to use











Note that now we can approximate this integral drawing from the known
importance density gt(st|st−1, yt). The importance density is indexed at time t,
meaning that it can be adjusted as new information is incorporated into the ap-
proximation. Also note that since we draw from the importance density instead





A.4.3.2 Sequential Importance Sampler.
Having defined the idea of an importance sampler, now I address how to
approximate p(st|yt) sequentially. Suppose that a swarm of particles {πjt−1,W jt−1}Nj=1







Concentrate the numerator, note that the particle approximation to p(st−1|yt−1)
is known. Conditional on this approximation, we draw (sjt) from an importance












Where the incremental weights, wt =
p(yt|st)p(st|st−1)
gt(st|st−1,yt) , are computed for each of the
draws from the importance density. A by-product of this approximation is a expres-









Because these weights are not drawn from the target density, we need to re-scale
them in order to update the approximation that we are really interested on. Let










































The approximation {πit,W it }Ni=1 suffers from particle degeneracy, in the sense that
some of the draws from the importance density have a negligible weight. To mitigate
this problem, the particles are resampled at the end of each step, keeping only those
that have positive weights.
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Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Solving the Two-Equation Model













We assume that rπ∗ ≥ 1 and ψ > 1.
The Targeted-Inflation Equilibrium and Deflation Equilibrium. Consider
a solution to (B.1.1) that takes the following form
πt = π∗γ exp[λεt]. (B.1.2)
We now determine values of γ and λ such that (B.1.1) is satisfied. We begin by




































Combining this expression with (B.1.1) yields




, γψ exp[(ψλ+ 1)εt]
}
. (B.1.3)
By choosing λ = −1/ψ, we ensure that the right-hand side of (B.1.3) is always
constant. Thus, (B.1.3) reduces to







Depending on whether the nominal interest rate is at the ZLB (Rt = 1) or not, we
obtain two solutions for γ by equating the left-hand-side of (B.1.4) with either the

































≥ 1 ≥ 1
rπ∗
.
A Sunspot Equilibrium. Let st ∈ {0, 1} denote the Markov-switching sunspot
process. Assume the system is in the targeted-inflation regime if st = 1 and that it
is in the deflation regime if st = 0 (the 0 is used to indicate that the system is near
the ZLB). The probabilities of staying in state 0 and 1, respectively, are denoted by
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ψ00 and ψ11. We conjecture that the inflation dynamics follow the process
π
(s)
t = π∗γ(st) exp[−εt/ψ] (B.1.6)
In this case condition (B.1.4) turns into
Et[πt+1|st = 0]/π∗ =
(





Et[πt+1|st = 1]/π∗ =
(
ψ11γ(1) + (1− ψ11)γ(0)
)
exp[σ2/(2ψ2)] = [γ(1)]ψ.
This system of two equations can be solved for γ(0) and γ(1) as a function of
the Markov-transition probabilities ψ00 and ψ11. Then (B.1.6) is a stable solution
of (B.1.1) provided that
[γ(0)]ψ ≤ 1
rπ∗
and [γ(1)]ψ ≥ 1
rπ∗
.
Sunspot Shock Correlated with Fundamentals. As before, let st ∈ {0, 1} be
a Markov-switching sunspot process. However, now assume that a state transition
is triggered by certain realizations of the monetary policy shock εt. In particular, if
st = 0, then suppose st+1 = 0 whenever εt+1 ≤ ε0, such that
ψ00 = Φ(ε0),
where Φ(·) is the cumulative density function of a N(0, 1). Likewise, if st = 1, then
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let st+1 = 0 whenever εt+1 > ε0, such that
ψ11 = 1− Φ(ε1).































































This system of two equations can be solved for γ(0) and γ(1) as a function of the
thresholds ε0 and ε1. Then (B.1.6) is a stable solution of (B.1.1) provided that
[γ(0)]ψ ≤ 1
rπ∗
and [γ(1)]ψ ≥ 1
rπ∗
.
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a) Dynamics. BSGU constructed
equilibria in which the economy transitioned from the targeted-inflation equilibrium
to the deflation equilibrium. Consider the following law of motion for inflation
π
(BGSU)






Here, γ∗ was defined in (B.1.5) and −t0 can be viewed as the initialization period
for the inflation process. We need to verify that π
(BGSU)
t satisfies (B.1.1). From the


















we deduce that the law of motion for π
(BGSU)











−→ 0 as t −→ ∞. Thus, the
economy will move away from the targeted-inflation equilibrium and at some suitably
defined t∗ reach the deflation equilibrium and remain there permanently. Overall







if t ≤ t∗
γD exp[−εt/ψ] otherwise
, (B.1.8)
where γ∗ and γD were defined in (B.1.5).
Alternative Deflation Equilibria. Around the deflation steady state, the system
is locally indeterminate. This suggests that we can construct alternative solutions
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where c is a cutoff value. The intuition for this solution is the following. Large
positive shocks ε that could push the nominal interest rate above one, are offset by
downward movements in inflation. Negative shocks do not need to be offset because
they push the desired gross interest rate below one, and the max operator in the
policy rule keeps the interest rate at one. Formally, we can compute the expected


























































Here Φ(·) denotes the cdf of a standard Normal random variable. Now define





























B.2 Equilibrium Conditions for the Model of Section 1.4
In this section we sketch the derivation of the equilibrium conditions presented
in Section 1.4.
B.2.1 Households























PtCt + Tt +Bt +Mt = PtWtHt +Mt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 + PtDt + PtSCt,
Consumption and bond holdings. Let βsλt+s be the Lagrange multiplier on the
household budget constraint, the first-order condition with respect to consumption
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Combining the previous definition with the bond holding first order condition we




























Labor-Leisure Choice. Taking first-order conditions with respect to Ht yields the











B.2.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
Each intermediate good producers buys labor services Ht(j) at the real wage
Wt. Firms face nominal rigidities in terms of price adjustment costs and the ad-







. We assume that the adjustment cost function twice-continously differ-
entiable and weakly convex Φ′p ≥ 0 and Φ′′p ≥ 0. The firm maximizes real profits
























sQt+s|t to denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with this con-
straint.
Price setting decision. Setting Qt|t = 1, the first-order condition with respect to











































Symmetric equilibrium. We restrict attention to a symmetric equilibrium where
all firms choose the same price Pt(j) = Pt ∀j. This assumption implies that in
equilibrium all firms face identical marginal costs and demand the same amount
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of labor input. Combining the firms’ price setting and labor demand first order




















































The technology process introduces a long-run trend in the variables of the
model. To make the model stationary we use the following transformations: yt =
Yt/At, ct = Ct/At, and note that Yt/Yt−1 =
yt
yt−1
γzt. We also define the gross






























































B.3 An Approximate Solution To a Simplified Model
In this section we will derive an approximate piece-wise linear solution for the
DSGE model. Rather than constructing a sunspot equilibrium, we will focus on the
targeted-inflation equilibrium and a minimal-state-variable deflation equilibrium.
The main purpose is to highlight the kink in the decision rules, which motivates the
piece-wise smooth numerical approximation used for the full model. We consider
the case of quasi-linear preferences with χh = 1 and η =∞ and will impose further
restrictions below to simplify the analytical derivations. The equilibrium conditions


























































B.3.1 Approximation of Targeted-Inflation Equilibrium




























Log-Linearization. We omit the hats from variables that capture deviations





(Rt − Et[πt+1 + zt+1]).






















τct − yt − Et[τct+1 − yt+1] + E[πt+1]
)
− φβπ2∗Et[πt+1].
Log-linearizing the aggregate resource constraint (B.3.2) yields
ct = yt −
1/g∗
1/g∗ − φ(π∗ − π̄)2
gt −
φπ∗(π∗ − π̄)
1/g∗ − φ(π∗ − π̄)2
πt
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Finally, the monetary policy rule becomes
Rt = max
{
− ln(rπ∗), (1− ρR)ψ1πt + (1− ρR)ψ2(yt− yt−1 + zt) + ρRt−1 + σRεR,t
}
.
Approximate Piecewise-Linear Solution in Special Case. To simplify the
exposition, we impose the following restrictions on the DSGE model parameters:




− ln(rπ∗), ψπt + σRεR,t
}
(B.3.5)
ct = Et[ct+1]− (Rt − Et[πt+1])
πt = βEt[πt+1] + κct.
It is well known that if the shocks are small enough such that the ZLB is non-
binding, the linearized system has a unique stable solution for ψ > 1. Since the
exogenous shocks are iid and the simplified system has no endogenous propagation
mechanism, consumption, output, inflation, and interest rates will also be iid and
can be expressed as a function of εR,t. In turn, the conditional expectations of
inflation and consumption equal their unconditional means, which we denote by µπ
and µc, respectively.
The Euler equation in (B.3.5) simplifies to the static relationship
ct = −Rt + µc + µπ. (B.3.6)
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Similarly, the Phillips curve in (B.3.5) becomes
πt = κct + βµπ. (B.3.7)
Combining (B.3.6) and (B.3.7) yields
πt = −κRt + (κ+ β)µπ + κµc. (B.3.8)
We now can use (B.3.8) to eliminate inflation from the monetary policy rule:
Rt = max
{










(κ+ β)ψµπ + κψµc + σRεR,t
]
.
Let ε̄R,t be the value of the monetary policy shock for which Rt = − ln(rπ∗) and the
two terms in the max operator of (B.3.9) are equal
σRε̄R,t = −(1 + κψ) ln(rπ∗)− (κ+ β)ψµπ − κψµc.
To complete the derivation of the equilibrium interest rate, it is useful to
distinguish the following two cases. Case (i): suppose that εR,t < ε̄R,t. We will
verify that Rt = R
(1)
t is consistent with (B.3.9). If the monetary policy shock is less
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than the threshold value, then
(κ+ β)ψµπ + κψµc + σRε̄R,t < −(1 + κψ) ln(rπ∗).
Thus,
−κψR(1)t + (κ+ β)ψµπ + κψµc + σRεR,t < −κψR(1)t − (1 + κψ) ln(rπ∗) = − ln(rπ∗),
which confirms that (B.3.9) is satisfied.
Case (ii): suppose that εR,t > ε̄R,t. We will verify that Rt = R
(2)
t is consistent
with (B.3.9). If the monetary policy shock is greater than the threshold value, then
(κ+ β)ψµπ + κψµc + σRε̄R,t > −(1 + κψ) ln(rπ∗).
In turn,




(κ+ β)ψµπ + κψµc + σRεR,t
]





(κ+ β)ψµπ + κψµc + σRεR,t
]
> − ln(rπ∗),
which confirms that (B.3.9) is satisfied.
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ψ(κ+ β)µπ + κψµc + σRεR,t
]}
. (B.3.10)






(1− ψβ)µπ + µc − σRεR,t
]
if Rt ≥ − ln(rπ∗)
ln(rπ∗) + µc + µπ otherwise
. (B.3.11)






(κ+ β)µπ + κµc − κσRεR,t
]
if Rt ≥ − ln(rπ∗)
κ ln(rπ∗) + (κ+ β)µπ + κµc otherwise
. (B.3.12)
If X ∼ N(µ, σ2) and C is a truncation constant, then
E[X|X ≥ C] = µ+ σφN(α)
1− ΦN(α)
,
where α = (C − µ)/σ, φN(x) and ΦN(α) are the probability density function (pdf)
and the cumulative density function (cdf) of a N(0, 1). Define the cutoff value
C = −(1 + κψ) ln(rπ∗)− (κ+ β)ψµπ − κψµc. (B.3.13)
Using the definition of a cdf and the formula for the mean of a truncated normal
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random variable, we obtain
P[εR,t ≥ C/σR] = 1− ΦN(Cy/σR)









(1− ψβ)µπ + µc
]
− σRφN(Cy/σR)










(κ+ β)µπ + κµc
]
− κσRφN(Cy/σR)




κ ln(rπ∗) + (κ+ β)µπ + κµc
]
The constants C, µc, and µπ can be obtained by solving the system of nonlinear
equations composed of (B.3.13) to (B.3.15).
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B.3.2 Approximation of Deflation Equilibrium
Steady State. As before, let λ = ν(1− β). The steady-state nominal interest rate




























Log-Linearization. We omit the tildes from variables that capture deviations from




(Rt − Et[πt+1 + zt+1]).






















τct − yt − Et[τct+1 − yt+1] + E[πt+1]
)
− φβ3Et[πt+1].
Log-linearizing the aggregate resource constraint (B.3.2) yields
ct = yt −
1/g∗
1/g∗ − φ(β − π̄)2
gt −
φβ(β − π̄)
1/g∗ − φ(β − π̄)2
πt
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Finally, the monetary policy rule becomes
Rt = max
{
0, −(1− ρR) ln(rπ∗)− (1− ρR)ψ1 ln(π∗/β)
+(1− ρR)ψ1πt + (1− ρR)ψ2(yt − yt−1 + zt) + ρRt−1 + σRεR,t
}
.
Approximate Piecewise-Linear Solution in Special Case. As for the ap-
proximate analysis of the targeted-inflation equilibrium, we impose the following
restrictions on the DSGE model parameters: τ = 1, γ = 1, π̄ = π∗, ψ1 = ψ, ψ2 = 0,
ρR = 0, ρz = 0, and ρg = 0. In the deflation equilibrium, the steady-state inflation
rate is πD = β. To ease the expositions, we assume that the terms |πD − π̄| that
appear in the log-linearized equations above are negligible. Denote percentage de-
viations of a variable xt from its deflation steady state by x̃t = ln(xt/xD). If we let
κD = cD/(νφβ
2) and using the steady-state relationship r = 1/β
R̃t = max
{
0, −(ψ − 1) ln(rπ∗) + ψπ̃t + σRεR,t
}
c̃t = Et[c̃t+1]− (R̃t − Et[π̃t+1]) (B.3.16)
π̃t = βEt[π̃t+1] + κDc̃t.
Provided that ψ > 1, the ZLB is binding with high probability if the shock standard
deviation σR is small. In this case, R̃t = 0. An equilibrium in which all variables
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ψ(κ+ β)µDπ + κψµ
D







(1− ψβ)µDπ + µDc + (ψ − 1) ln(rπ∗)− σRεR,t
]










(κ+ β)µDπ + κµ
D
c + κ(ψ − 1) ln(rπ∗)− κσRεR,t
]
if R̃t ≥ 0




In this simple model, the decision rules have a kink at the point in the state
space where the two terms in the max operator of the interest rate equation are
equal to each other. In the targeted-inflation equilibrium, this point in the state





− (1 + κψ) ln(rπ∗)− (κ+ β)ψµ∗π − κψµ∗c
]
,





(ψ − 1) ln(rπ∗)− (κ+ β)ψµDπ − κψµDc
]
,




R , its marginal effect on the endoge-
nous variables is zero. To the extent that ε̄DR > 0 > ε̄
∗
R, it takes a positive shock
in the deflation equilibrium to move away from the ZLB, whereas it takes a large
negative monetary shock in the targeted-inflation equilibrium to hit the ZLB.
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B.4 Computational Details
B.4.1 Model Solution Algorithm
Algorithm 1 (Model Solution)
1. Construct solutions for the targeted-inflation equilibrium (st = 1 with proba-
bility one) and the deflation equilibrium (st = 0 with probability one):
(a) Start with a guess for Θ. For the targeted-inflation equilibrium, this guess
is obtained from a first-order linear approximation around the targeted-
inflation steady state. For the deflation equilibrium, it is obtained by
assuming constant decision rules for inflation and E at the deflation steady
state.
(b) Given this guess, simulate the model for a large number of periods. We
use 10,000 simulations after a burn-in period of 150 observations.
(c) Use the cluster-grid algorithm in Judd, Maliar and Maliar (2010) to ob-
tain a collection of grid points for the model solution. For the deflation
equilibrium we use the a time-separted grid instead, because this algo-
rithm suits the behavior of this equilibrium better, since there are many
periods when the economy is on the “edge” of the ergodic distribution
at the ZLB. Label these grid points as {S1, ...,SM}. For a fourth-order
approximation, we use M = 130.
(d) Solve for the Θ by minimizing the sum of squared residuals using Algo-
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rithm 2.
2. Repeat steps (b)-(d) a sufficient number of times so that the ergodic distribu-
tion remains unchanged from one iteration to the next.
3. Initialize the sunspot solution decision rules for st = 1 (st = 0) with the
targeted-inflation equilibrium decision rules decision rules that come from the
targeted-inflation (deflation) equilibrium obtained in step 1. Given this guess,
simulate the sunspot model for a large number of periods as in (b). For the
sunspot model this simulation also includes the simulated path of the sunspot
variable st.
4. Given the simulated path, obtain the grid for the state variables over which the
approximation needs to be accurate. For the sunspot equilibrium, we use the
same time-separated grid algorithm to deliver the grid points that represent
the ergodic set. For a fourth order approximation of Japan we set M = 624
and obtain 50% of this points conditioning on st = 1 and the remaining are
conidtioned on st = 0. This oversamples points from the st = 0 regime to
increase the accuracy of the solution.
For the US we obtained 268 grid points from the ergodic distribution using
the cluster-grid algorithm. Again we obtain 50% of the points conditioning
on st = 1 and the rest conditioning on st = 0. The remaining 356 points
come from the filtered states. We use 36 filtered states corresponding to the
period 2000:Q1-2008:Q4 and 320 points corresponding to filtered states using
multiple particles per period from 2009:Q1-2013:Q4.
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5. Solve for the Θ by minimizing the sum of squared residuals using Algorithm 2.
6. Repeat steps 2.-5. a sufficient number of times so that the ergodic distribution
of the sunspot model remains unchanged from one iteration to the next. For
the US sunspot equilibrium, we also iterate between solution and filtering to
make sure the filtered states used in the solution grid remain unchanged.
Algorithm 2 (Determinining the Approximate Decision Rules)
1. For a generic grid point Si and the current value for Θ, compute f 1π(Si; Θ),
f 2π(Si; Θ), f 1E (Si; Θ), and f 2E (Si; Θ).
2. Assume ζi ≡ I{R(Si,Θ) > 1} = 1 and compute πi, and Ei, as well as yi and
ci using (2.23) and (2.25).
3. Compute Ri based on (2.15) using πi and yi obtained in (2). If Ri is greater
than unity, then ζi is indeed equal to one. Otherwise, set ζi = 0 (and thus
Ri = 1) and recompute all other objects.
4. The final step is to compute the residual functions. In each regime st = {0, 1}
there are four residuals, corresponding to the four functions being approxi-
mated. For a given set of state variables Si, only two of them will be relevant
since we either need the constrained decision rules or the unconstrained ones.
Taking into account the transition of the sunspot the residual functions will
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be given by
R1(Si) = Ei −
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
c(S ′)−τ
γz′π(S ′)dF (z
′) dF (g′) dF (ε′R) dF (s
′) (B.4.1)
R2(Si) = ξ (ci, πi, yi) (B.4.2)
− φβ
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
c(S ′)−τy(S ′) [π(S ′)− π̄] π(S ′)dF (z′) dF (g′) dF (ε′R) dF (s′)
Note that this step involves computing π(S ′), y(S ′), c(S ′), and R(S ′) which is
done following steps (1)-(3) above for each value of S ′. We use a non product
monomial integration rule to evaluate these integrals.
5. The objective function to be minimized is the sum of squared residuals ob-
tained in (4).
For the target-inflation (deflation) regimes, we first solve for a second-order
polynomial approximation of the decision rules and move to a third- and fourth-
order polynomial using the previous order solution as initial guess. We use analytical
derivatives of the objection function, which speeds up the solution by two orders of
magnitude. As a measure of accuracy, we compute the approximation errors from
B.4.1 and B.4.3, converted to consumption units. For the sunspot equilibrium the
approximation errors are in the order of 10−4 or smaller.
Figures B-1 and B-2 show the solution grid for the sunspot equilibrium. For
each panel, we have Rt−1 on the x axis and one of the other state variables on the y
axis. The red (blue) dots are the grid points that represent the ergodic distribution
conditional on st = 1 (st = 0). For the U.S. we include filtered grid points into the
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Figure B-1: Solution Grid for the Targeted-Inflation Equilibrium - US
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construction of the grid. The yellow dots denote filtered states between 2000 to 2008;
the green (turquoise) dots represent filtered states from 2009 to 2013 conditioning
on st = 1 (st = 0). It is evident that for the U.S. the filtered states lie in the
tails of the ergodic distribution of the sunspot equilibrium. By adding these filtered
states to the grid points, we ensure that our approximation will be accurate in these
low-probability regions.
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Figure B-2: Solution Grid for the Targeted-Inflation Equilibrium - Japan
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B.4.2 Details of Policy Experiments
Algorithm 3 (Effect of Combined Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interven-
tion)
Here we describe how we complement the fiscal policy intervention of size
f with a commitment of the central bank to keep the policy rate at or near the
ZLB. We use x̃ to denote the mean value of x obtained from the particle filter.
(See Section 2.5.6.1 for details.) We use H = 11, which means the central bank’s
commitment is in place for three years.
For some t in the ZLB period of U.S. or Japan, we do the following:
1. Initialize the simulation by setting (Rt−1, yt−1, zt−1, gt−1, st) = (R̃t−1, ỹt−1, z̃t−1, g̃t−1, s̃t)
2. Generate baseline trajectories based on the innovation sequence {εi,t+h}Hh=0 =
{ε̃i,t+h}Hh=0 and {st+h}Hh=0 = {s̃t+h}Hh=0, which essentially means in the baseline
trajectories all output growth, inflation and the interest rate equals their data
counterparts up to a measurement error we use in filtering.
3. Generate the innovation sequence for the counterfactual trajectories according
to
εIg,t = f + ε̃g,t; ε
I
g,t+h = ε̃g,t+h for h = 1, . . . , H;
εIz,t+h = ε̃z,t+h for h = 1, . . . , H;
sIt+h = s̃t+h
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mine εIR,t+h by solving for the smallest ε̂R,t+h such that it is less than 2σR in
absolute value, that yields either
RIt+h(ε
I




R,t+h = 0)−RIt+h(εIR,t+h = ε̂R,t+h)
)
= 1.
4. Conditional on (Rt−1, yt−1, zt−1, gt−1), compute {Rt+h, yt+h, πt+h}Hh=0 and {RIt+h, yIt+h, πIt+h}Hh=0
based on {εt, st} and {εIt , sIt}, respectively, and let
IRF (xt+h|εg,t, εR,t:t+h) = ln xIt+h − lnxt+h. (B.4.3)
In tables and figures we report the median and the point-wise 20% and 80%
response across all possible initial period t. When we consider only a fiscal policy,
we set εIR,t+h = 0 for h = 0, ..., H as well.
B.5 Data
B.5.1 United States
For the US we collected data from the FRB St. Louis FRED database. We ob-
tained real GDP (GDPC96) and converted into per capita terms using the Civilian
Noninstitutional Population (CNP16OV). The population series is smoothed apply-
ing an eight-quarter backward-looking moving average filter. The measure of the
price level is the GDP deflator (GDPDEF) and the inflation rate is computed as its
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log difference annualized and in percents. The interest rate is the average effective
federal funds rate (FEDFUNDS) averaged over each quarter.
B.5.2 Japan
For Japan we collected real GDP (RGDP) from the Cabinet Office’s National Ac-
counts. We used the statistical release of benchmark year 2005 that covers the
period 1994.Q1 - 2013.Q4. To extend the sample we collected RGDP figures from
the benchmark year 2000 and constructed a series spanning the period 1981.Q1-
2013.Q1 using the quarterly growth rate of the RGDP benchmark year 2000. Our
measure of per-capita output is RGDP divided by the total population of 15 years
and over. We smoothed the quarterly growth of the population series using an eight
quarter backward-looking moving average filter. We obtained population data from
the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Historical data Table b-1.
For the price level we use the implicit GDP deflator index from the Cabinet Office.
We also extend the benchmark year 2005 release using the growth rate of the index
from the benchmark year 2000 figures. For the nominal interest rate we use the Bank
of Japan’s uncollateralized call rate (STSTRACLUCON) from 1986:M7-2013:M12.
To complete the series from 1981.M1 - 1985.M6 we use the monthly average of the
collateralized overnight call rate (STSTRACLCOON). Finally the monthly figures
are transformed using quarterly averages over the sample period.
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B.5.3 Fiscal Programs in Japan
Table B-1 shows a list of fiscal programs that were in effect in Japan from 1998
to 2013. For each program we show the size of the program, and the amount paid
directly by the central (national) government as a percentage of GDP and a short
description. In the last three columns we show the major concerns of the government
in passing each measure, focusing on concerns about real activity, exchange rate and











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.6 DSGE Model Estimation
B.6.1 Estimation Sample
For Japan we restrict the estimation sample to the period 1981:Q1 to 1994:Q4.
Effectively the nominal interest reached the zero lower bound in the third quarter of
1998, however we stop estimation earlier to avoid non-linearities caused by the zero
lower bound. Our choice for the estimation sample is consistent with other studies
that used perturbation-based techniques to estimate structural parameters for the
Japanese economy, e.g. Sugo and Ueda (2008) and Fujiwara, Hirose and Shintani
(2011). For the US we estimate the model from 1984:Q1 to 2007:Q4. For a similar
reason we truncate the estimation before the nominal interest rate reached the zero
lower bound.
B.6.2 Priors for estimation
We use similar priors for both countries. For instance the prior mean for τ
implies a risk-aversion coefficient of 2. We specify the prior for the price-adjustment-
cost parameter φ indirectly through a prior for the slope κ of the New-Keynesian
Phillips curve in a linearized version of the model. For both countries this prior
encompasses values that imply an essentially flat as well as a fairly steep Phillips
curve, with a prior mean of 0.3. The prior for the inflation response coefficient in the
monetary policy rule is centered at 1.5 with a tighter prior because it was difficult to
identify this parameter from the data. Finally, we use diffuse priors for the param-
eters associated with the exogenous shock processes. Marginal prior distributions
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Table B-2: Priors for Estimation
US Japan
Parameter Density Param (1) Param (2) Param (1) Param (2)
τ Gamma 2 0.25 2 0.5
κ Gamma 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1
ψ1 Gamma 1.5 0.05 1.5 0.05
ρr Beta 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.2
ρg Beta 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.2
ρz Beta 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2
100σr Inv Gamma 0.3 4.0 0.3 4.0
100σg Inv Gamma 0.4 4.0 0.4 4.0
100σz Inv Gamma 0.4 4.0 0.4 4.0
Notes: Para (1) and Para(2) are the mean and the standard deviations for Beta and Gamma
distributions; s and ν for the Inverse Gamma distribution, where pIG(σ|ν, s) ∝ σ−ν−1e−νs
2/2σ2 .
for all DSGE model parameters are summarized in Table B-2. We assume that the
parameters are a priori independent. Thus, the joint prior distribution is given by
the product of the marginals.
B.6.3 Posterior Simulator
We estimate a second-order approximation of the DSGE model using the ran-
dom walk Metropolis algorithm (RWM) described in An and Schorfheide (2007).
To initialize the RWM chain we first estimate a log-linearized version of the DSGE
model to obtain a covariance matrix for the proposal distribution. Using the pos-
terior mode and the covariance matrix of the log-linearized model we then run the
RWM algorithm using the particle filter to evaluate the likelihood of the non-linear
model. The covariance matrix of the proposal distribution is scaled such that the
RWM algorithm has an acceptance rate of approximately 50%. We use 50,000 par-
ticles to approximate the likelihood and set the variance of the measurement errors
175
to 10% of the sample variance of the observables to help estimation. We obtain
100,000 draws of parameters from the posterior distribution. Summary statistics of
the posterior distribution are based on the last 50,000 draws of the sequence.
B.7 Impulse Responses
We show the impulse response to one standard deviation shocks in Figure B-
3. The variables are in columns and the three shocks, εz, εg and εr are in rows.
Since these are responses from a nonlinear model, we need to explain how we run
the experiments. We start with 100 draws from the ergodic distribution for the
U.S., conditioning on s = 0 and s = 1 separately. Then using these 100 draws as
initial states along with their associated s value, we compute the response of the
economy to each shock relative to a baseline with no impulse. In both economies all
exogenous variables evolve according to their stochastic processes and throughout
the duration of the exercise the value of s remains the same. In the figure we report
the point-wise median response in percentage units.
The responses when s = 1 is entirely standard: a technology shock increases
output and interest rates and reduces inflation, a demand shock increases all there
variables and a monetary policy shock increases interest rates and reduces inflation
and output. With s = 0 a few significant differences emerge. First, the effect of
shocks die out quicker. Second, monetary policy shocks have a very muted effect on
inflation and output. Third, and most importantly, a positive government spending
(demand) shock reduces inflation, as opposed to increase it as in when s = 1. This
is because the aggregate demand curve becomes upward sloped when s = 0, similar
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Figure B-3: Impulse Responses - U.S. Ergodic Distribution
εz
Interest Rate (%)




























































to what Mertens and Ravn (2014) discuss.
B.8 Particle Filter For Sunspot Equilibrium
The particle filter is used to extract information about the state variables of
the model from data on output growth, inflation, and nominal interest rates over
the periods 1984:Q1 to 2013:Q4 (U.S.) and 1981:Q1 to 2013:Q4 (Japan).
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B.8.1 State-Space Representation
Let dt be the 3×1 vector of observables consisting of output growth, inflation,
and nominal interest rates. The vector xt stacks the continuous state variables,
which are given by xt = [Rt, yt, yt−1, zt, gt, At]
′ and st ∈ {0, 1}, is the Markov-
switching process.
dt = Ψ(xt) + νt (B.8.1)
P{st = 1} =

(1− p00) if st−1 = 0
p11 if st−1 = 1
(B.8.2)
xt = Fst(xt−1, εt) (B.8.3)
The first equation is the measurement equation, where νt ∼ N(0,Σν) is a vector
of measurement errors. The second equation represents the law of motion of the
Markov-switching process. The third equation corresponds to the law of motion of
the continuous state variables. The vector εt ∼ N(0, I) stacks the innovations εz,t,
εg,t, and εR,t. The functions F0(·) and F1(·) are generated by the model solution
procedure. We subsequently use the densities p(dt|xt), p(st|st−1), and p(xt|xt−1, st)
to summarize the measurement and the state transition equations.
B.8.2 Sequential Importance Sampling Approximation
Let wt = [x
′
t, st]
′ and Dt0:t1 = {dt0 , . . . , dt1}. Particle filtering relies on se-
quential importance sampling approximations. The distribution p(wt−1|D1:t−1) is
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t−1 is the i’th particle, π
(i)
t−1 is its weight, and N is the number of particles.
An important step in the filtering algorithm is to draw a new set of particles for
period t. In general, these particles are drawn from a distribution with a density
that is proportional to g(wt|D1:t, w(i)t−1), which may depend on the particle value in
period t − 1 as well as the observation dt in period t. This procedure leads to an





































































































respectively. In simple versions of the particle filter, w
(i)
t is often generated by
simulating the model forward, which means that g(w
(i)
t |D1:T , w(i)t−1) ∝ p(w(i)t |w(i)t−1),
and the formula for the particle weights simplifies considerably. Unfortunately, this
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approach is quite inefficient in our application, and we require a more elaborate
density g(·|·) described below that accounts for information in dt. The resulting
extension of the particle filter is known as auxiliary particle filter, e.g. Pitt and
Shephard (1999).
B.8.3 Filtering
Initialization. To generate the initial set of particles {(w(i)0 , π(i)0 }Ni=1, for each i,
simulate the DSGE model for T0 periods, starting from the targeted-inflation steady
state, and set π
(i)
0 = 1.
Sequential Importance Sampling. For t = 1 to T :




t conditional on w
(i)
t−1 from g(wt|D1:t, w(i)t−1).
(b) Compute the unnormalized particle weights π̃
(i)
t according to (B.8.6).
2. Compute the normalized particle weights π
(i)








3. Resample the particles via deterministic resampling (see Kitagawa (1996)).
Reset weights to be π
(i)
t = 1 and approximate p(wt|D1:t) by {(w(i)t , π(i)t )}ni=1.
B.8.4 Tuning of the Filter
In the empirical analysis, we set T0 = 50 and N = 1, 000, 000. We also fix the
measurement error variance for output growth, inflation, and interest rates to be
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equal to 10% of the sample variance of these series. We assume that the economies
are in the targeted-inflation regime during the initialization period. Since our model
has discrete and continuous state variables, we write
p(wt|wt−1) =

p0(xt|xt−1, st = 0)P{st = 0|st−1} if st = 0
p1(xt|xt−1, st = 1)P{st = 1|st−1} if st = 1
and consider proposal densities of the form
q(wt|wt−1, dt) =

q0(xt|xt−1, dt, st = 0)λ(wt−1, dt) if st = 0
q1(xt|xt−1, dt, st = 1)(1− λ(wt−1, dt)) if st = 1
,
where λ(xt−1, dt) is the probability that st = 0 under the proposal distribution. We
use q(·) instead of g(·) to indicate that the densities are normalized to integrate to
one.
We effectively generate draws from the proposal density through forward it-
eration of the state transition equation. To adapt the proposal density to the ob-
servation dt, we draw ε
(i)
t ∼ N(µ(i),Σ(i)) instead of the model-implied εt ∼ N(0, I).
In slight abuse of notation (ignoring that the dimension of xt is larger than the
dimension of εt and that its distribution is singular), we can apply the change of
variable formula to obtain a representation of the proposal density
q(x
(i)




Using the same change-of-variable formula, we can represent
p(x
(i)
t |x(i)t−1) = pε(F−1(x(i)t |x(i)t−1))
∣∣∣∣∣∂F−1(x(i)t |x(i)t−1)∂xt
∣∣∣∣∣
By construction, the Jacobian terms cancel and the ratio that is needed to calculate
the unnormalized particle weights for period t in (B.8.6) simplifies to
π̃
(i)

















t − µ(i))′[Σ(i)]−1(ε(i)t − µ(i))
}π(i)t−1.
The choice of µ and Σ is described below.
Let wt−1|t−1 be a particle filter approximation of E[wt−1|D1:t−1] and define







We use a grid search over εt to determine a value ε̄ that maximizes this objective
function and then set µ(i) = ε̄. Moreover, we let Σ(i) = I. (Executing the grid search
conditional on each w
(i)
t−1, i = 1, . . . , N turned out to be too time consuming.)
B.8.5 Filtered Shocks
The filtered innovations are summarized in Figure B-4 and Figure B-5. The
shaded area indicates time periods in which the economy is in the deflation regime.
The vertical red line indicates the end of the estimation sample.
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Figure B-4: Filtered Shocks: U.S. 1984:Q1 - 2013:Q4
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Figure B-5: Filtered Shocks: Japan 1981:Q1 - 2013:Q4
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Gilchrist, Simon and Egon Zakraǰsek. 2012. “Credit Spreads and Business Cycle
Fluctuations.” American Economic Review, 102(4).
Gilchrist, Simon, Vladimir Yankov and Egon Zakraǰsek. 2009. “Credit Market
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